Civil Defense in Israel

Early warning, public guidance, and protective construction are the three principal pillars of Israel’s passive civil defense against rocket and mortar attacks.[1] Protective infrastructure includes underground shelters and protected rooms in homes, offices, schools, and public buildings, while instructions explain how civilians should respond when warnings sound.[1] These arrangements address threats from several directions, including Gaza, Lebanon, and Syria.[1]

Civil defense is distinct from active interception, although the two operate alongside one another.[1] Iron Dome is an active-defense system designed to intercept rockets and artillery shells, with interception decisions informed by whether a projectile is expected to land where it could cause damage.[1] Interception reduces casualties and destruction but does not eliminate danger: falling debris and shrapnel can still cause harm, making sheltering necessary even where active defenses operate.[1]

The institutional system extends beyond a single military organization.[3] Its functions include rescue, medical care, evacuation, essential supplies, continuity of infrastructure, public communication, and the maintenance of government and civilian activity during emergencies.[3] Armed community-defense formations constitute a related but distinct strand of this history: their immediate task is to respond to attackers until regular forces arrive, rather than to provide the sheltering, warnings, and emergency protection associated with the Home Front Command.[4]

The National Library of Israel traces organized Jewish community defense during the Arab Revolt of 1936–1939 to guards recruited with British authorization in May 1936 as “supernumerary police,” subsequently known as notrim.[4] The Jewish Agency helped identify recruits and supplied equipment, and many guards also belonged to the Haganah.[4] From late 1936, nearly every Jewish settlement had trained, armed guards able to maintain watches and respond to danger.[4]

Their duties expanded to protecting agricultural areas outside settlements and patrolling roads.[4] By 1938, neighboring settlements were grouped into blocks, with mobile units called Mishmar Na, or the Mobile Guard, responsible for securing roads and responding to attacks throughout their areas.[4] Local guards provided immediate defense until mobile reinforcements arrived.[4] At Tirat Zvi on February 28, 1938, guards resisted an estimated 40–100 attackers for nearly three hours, preventing repeated attempts to enter the kibbutz despite being outnumbered and facing explosive devices.[4]

By the end of 1939, the Jewish Settlement Police consolidated about 1,300 full-time notrim into 12 regional units.[4] During the 1948 War of Independence, these formations became a backbone of territorial defense, and their units, weapons, and vehicles were incorporated into six brigades of the emerging IDF.[4] After the war, settlements were organized into areas and regional frameworks, with residents assigned defensive roles through reserve service, including construction of fortifications.[4]

This territorial system was intended to contribute to defense against an organized army, but investment increasingly favored offensive capabilities, armored forces, and air power.[4] Infiltration became the principal threat in the early 1950s, and the Israel Police established the Border Police, or Magav, in 1953 to counter it.[4] Its first commander, Pinhas Kopel, drew on his experience as a noter.[4] Border communities appointed security coordinators responsible for local defense, liaison with security forces, and weapons management; from 1954, the Border Police also recruited temporary civilian auxiliary police alongside unpaid volunteers.[4]

The Civil Guard, established in 1974, added civilian volunteers trained to protect communities from terrorist attacks.[4] Local readiness squads developed as small immediate-response forces intended to hold the first line until regular forces arrived.[4] After October 7, 2023, the Israel Police and Ministry of National Security established more than 900 new readiness squads.[4]

The Israeli Civil Defense organization, HAGA, was established in May 1948 with a mission described as “Bombardment Defense Service,” as the state and IDF were taking shape.[2] Its creation followed Egyptian air attacks on Tel Aviv that killed 172 people, many of them women and children, and Lieutenant Colonel Mordechai Nimtza-Bi became its commander.[2] The Civil Defense Law of 1951 defined its purpose as taking measures to protect civilians from hostile attacks or limit their effects, emphasizing the saving of lives.[2]

Israel’s small size and the proximity of population centers to borders complicated civilian protection, while military planning from the early 1950s emphasized carrying warfare beyond the country’s borders.[5] Jerusalem, Tel Aviv, and other cities had been attacked in 1948 and, to a lesser extent, in 1967.[5] An INSS history argues that across the Sinai Campaign, Six-Day War, War of Attrition, Yom Kippur War, and First Lebanon War, planning generally assumed that the IDF could seal the borders while police and civilian agencies managed other threats.[2] Following a decision to reinforce HAGA after the Yom Kippur War, the Israeli Regional Guard, HAGMAR, was incorporated into it in August 1977.[2]

The 1990 Gulf crisis brought the prospect of Iraqi chemical attacks into household preparedness.[5] Military leaders and the Ministry of Defence initially opposed immediate distribution of protective kits, citing panic, possible signals of impending war, and deterioration of the equipment; Foreign Minister David Levy and senior officials favored distribution to ease anxiety.[5] On August 22, 1990, the ministers responsible for security affairs accepted the military position, but distribution began in October and November and was almost complete by the end of December.[5]

Communication itself became a preparedness problem.[5] An August 1990 television appeal by a civil-defense commander urged households to acquire a fire extinguisher, first-aid kit, insulating materials, two weeks’ food, and a battery-powered radio.[5] Intended to prepare families for emergencies including electricity failure, the advice caused panic among a public that had not been adequately briefed, while military leaders objected to its timing.[5] Equipment also presented practical difficulties: masks adapted for bearded users were initially in short supply, prompting public and parliamentary debate over priorities.[5]

When Iraqi missiles began striking civilian centers in January 1991, warning sirens, gas masks, and sealed rooms became familiar features of daily life.[6] Residents were told to carry gas masks throughout the day, damaged apartment buildings were evacuated, and an evening curfew disrupted entertainment, sports, social activity, and parts of the economy.[6] Because of fears of chemical warheads, residents were instructed to enter prepared sealed rooms rather than descend to shelters.[7] Almost all attacks occurred at night, apart from one Saturday-morning barrage.[7]

Thirty-nine missiles hit Israel between January 17 and the final Scud attack in February, affecting locations from Haifa to the Beersheba area; 1,644 families were evacuated and 4,095 buildings damaged.[6] A separate accounting of launches recorded 43 missiles directed at Israel: 26 toward Tel Aviv, eight toward Haifa, five toward Dimona, and four toward Samaria.[7] The first barrage on January 18 included eight missiles that exploded in the Tel Aviv and Haifa areas, while the nine-missile barrage of January 25 was the heaviest.[7] United States forces fired 54 Patriot missiles in attempts to intercept the Scuds.[7]

The consequences extended beyond direct blast injuries.[7] Records summarized in a later retrospective listed 229 people treated for direct-impact injuries, 540 for anxiety, and 222 after unnecessary atropine injections.[7] Deaths also resulted from heart attacks, panic, falls while reaching sealed rooms, and incorrect gas-mask use.[6][7] Many Tel Aviv residents left their homes, particularly at night, and the attacks had a profound psychological effect despite comparatively limited physical destruction.[2]

The Home Front Command was established in February 1992 as the IDF’s fourth command, with General Ze’ev Livne as its first commander.[2] Its establishment was a principal institutional lesson of the Gulf War and recognized that future warfare might not distinguish sharply between soldiers and civilians.[8] Its assigned responsibilities included developing civil-defense doctrine, training and guiding civilians, directing first-response agencies, and coordinating ministries, local authorities, and the private sector.[2]

The new command also assumed responsibilities for protective-kit distribution, sirens, public communications, sealed-room and protected-space guidance, and coordination of rescue and medical organizations.[9] Its remit covered preparation before conflict, support during attacks, search and rescue afterward, and assistance with rapid recovery.[9] In a 2011 organizational description, it was headed by a major general directly subordinate to the chief of staff and serving in the IDF General Staff Forum.[9] That description identified five districts—North, Dan, Central, Jerusalem, and South—aligned with police districts, together with national rescue and training formations, chemical and biological defense battalions, and population-instruction functions.[9]

The 2006 Second Lebanon War exposed the civilian population to sustained rocket fire over 33 days.[2] Nearly 4,000 rockets were launched at northern civilian targets, averaging about 120 daily; 39 civilians were killed, more than 2,000 injured, and approximately 12,000 buildings damaged.[2] Hundreds of thousands of residents left their homes, and estimated national economic losses reached about NIS 30 billion.[2]

After the war, the command’s role broadened from a primarily technical and rescue-oriented mission toward preparation of the civilian population and infrastructure as a whole.[2] Warning systems, shelter instructions, rescue from wreckage, and public information were joined by work on social resilience and civilian readiness.[2] A later organizational account described more than 65,000 personnel, about 90 percent reservists, six regional headquarters, rescue regiments, and medical, logistical, and light-infantry units.[2]

The National Emergency Management Authority, NEMA, was established in 2007 to coordinate organizations operating on the civilian front.[2] It was placed within the Ministry of Defense, later spent a short period under the Ministry of Home Front Defense, and returned to the Defense Ministry after that ministry’s abolition in June 2014.[2][10] The Ministry of Home Front Defense itself had been created in 2011.[2] Under a 2018 arrangement, NEMA became the ministry’s national staff for strategic policy, supervision, budget allocation, and interagency coordination, while the Home Front Command was designated the operational arm for preparedness and coordination with local authorities and emergency agencies.[11]

A 2009 institutional framework identified an emergency network comprising NEMA, the National Emergency Economy Board, the Home Front Command, police, fire and rescue services, health institutions, Magen David Adom, local governments, and hazardous-materials monitoring bodies.[3] The economy board’s arrangements covered evacuation, assistance, casualties, utilities, food, communications, and infrastructure.[3] Emergency economic planning also involved an interministerial committee chaired by the defense minister and preparation through the board’s national headquarters.[12]

Local authorities provide the platform through which many central-government services reach communities during emergencies.[3] Their functions include preparing for crises and managing local response with assistance from Home Front Command representatives.[3] Emergency-service arrangements have also included municipal command posts and equipment depots, cooperation between firefighting services and military civil-defense authorities, and planning for evacuees’ housing and casualties.[13]

A 2009 resilience framework proposed that municipalities coordinate with neighboring jurisdictions, identify and train volunteers, plan for residents with special needs, and clarify expectations with residents, businesses, and nonprofit organizations.[3] Its account of emergency planning described an expectation that citizens could be self-sufficient for 72–96 hours because authorities might need several days to reach everyone; this was a historical planning assumption, not present-day public guidance.[3]

Search-and-rescue formations undertake missions in Israel and abroad during war, peacetime, and emergencies.[14] Specialist units were combined in 1984 into a formation using trained reservists alongside a regular force maintained in year-round readiness.[14] Operations are planned using expert assessments and field reports, and equipment includes an Israeli-developed device that detects seismic and acoustic emissions to locate people trapped beneath rubble.[14] The Home Front Command has also assisted in natural disasters and operated a large-scale coronavirus contact-tracing program, while its command center combined military and municipal information for operations and public communication.[15]

During the 1991 Gulf War, every incoming Iraqi Scud triggered sirens nationwide; later systems divided Israel into geographical warning areas so that alerts could be directed more precisely.[1] By 2015, more than NIS 545 million had been invested in warning systems and sirens during the preceding decade.[1] A subsequent account described 250 alert zones and plans to subdivide them into 1,800, allowing communities outside an immediate threat area to continue ordinary activity and encouraging compliance where warnings applied.[16]

The Home Front Command app, released for iPhone and Android in February 2016, used a phone’s GPS to warn users of nearby threats and provide response instructions.[17] Its described capabilities included warnings about rockets, terrorist attacks, and natural-disaster threats.[17] Sirens, broadcasting, websites, mobile notifications, and public information campaigns have therefore formed complementary channels rather than a single warning mechanism.[17][18]

Instructions vary with location and threat.[1] A 2015 account gave approximately 15 seconds to reach protection in the Gaza-border region and about 90 seconds in Tel Aviv and Jerusalem.[1] The guidance described immediate movement to the nearest protected area, or lying on the ground and covering the head when outdoors without access to an enclosed space, followed by at least ten minutes under protection to reduce exposure to debris and shrapnel.[1] Instructions were translated into Amharic, Arabic, English, French, and Russian, and a dedicated campaign addressed people with disabilities.[1]

A temporary arrangement announced in June 2025 for anticipated Iranian ballistic-missile attacks used several warning stages.[19] An app notification could precede an expected attack by 15–30 minutes, followed after launch detection by app and cell-broadcast alerts intended to provide about ten minutes to reach shelter.[19] Sirens sounded approximately 90 seconds before expected impact, with instructions to enter protection and remain until an all-clear; updates also indicated when a barrage was believed to have ended.[19]

Shai Secunda’s 2026 essay in the Jewish Review of Books describes another Iranian-threat warning experience: cellphone pre-warnings followed five to eight minutes later by sirens requiring entry into protected spaces.[20] These accounts concern particular reporting periods and threats, rather than a universal timetable for every Israeli alert.[19][20]

Post-Gulf War building requirements shifted protection toward reinforced rooms within residential buildings, intended to withstand conventional explosives and chemical threats.[2] New dwellings were being equipped with shelters from 1994, with oversight assigned to the Home Front Command.[2] A 2025 description dated the shift from communal shelters toward private in-home protected rooms to 1992.[21]

Protected spaces are classified by scale, including the apartment protected space, mamad; floor-level protected space, mamak; and institutional protected space, mammam.[22] Planning rules address dimensions, approved escape openings, wall thickness, and ventilation.[22] Community shelters are commonly called miklatim.[21] Supplementary structures known as miguniyot were developed where construction of code-compliant spaces was not feasible, but are not among the command’s official protected-space categories.[22]

Shelter selection depends on whether a location is ready for use and reachable within the available warning time.[23] Guidance reported in 2023 prioritized a private reinforced room or communal protected room in a workplace or public building, followed by a building shelter and then an accessible public shelter.[23] Where no designated space could be reached, an internal stairwell or an interior room with few external walls and windows was described as an alternative.[23] Underground parking lots were not considered shelters unless designated as such.[19]

Writing in Mosaic, Philologos distinguishes an ordinary merḥav mugan, or “protected space,” from a reinforced shelter: a sheltered stairwell or lobby away from windows may reduce exposure to blast and shrapnel without protecting against a ballistic missile striking the roof.[24] Reinforced shelters provide substantial protection but cannot guarantee absolute safety.[21] On October 17, 2018, a family survived a rocket strike on its Beersheba residential building by taking cover in its fortified room.[16]

Domestic shelter legislation assigns primary construction responsibility to property owners, with some responsibilities also falling on tenants and municipalities, while government subsidies have supported protection in particularly exposed areas.[1] Municipalities supervise private-shelter maintenance and maintain public shelters within their jurisdictions.[1] Public-shelter planning approval rests with local planning authorities, and cities typically maintain them; the Home Front Command may assist placement following a government decision or a request from a municipality or ministry.[25]

Nationwide Turning Point exercises began in 2007 following the Second Lebanon War.[18] Turning Point 3, held in June 2009 under the Ministry of Defense and NEMA, simulated prolonged escalation involving Gaza, a northern front, internal unrest, terrorism, natural disaster, epidemic, and hazardous-materials accidents.[3] Participants included the IDF, Home Front Command, ministries, municipalities, media, schools, and nongovernmental organizations; a national siren drill asked residents to enter protected spaces for 15 minutes.[3]

Turning Point 15 in 2015 sounded sirens during working hours and again in the evening to test access to shelter both at work and at home and check the siren network.[18] Mock warnings also appeared on television, radio, and the command’s website, with nationwide text-message reminders beforehand.[18] Scenarios included coordinated rocket attacks, damage to essential infrastructure, a cyberattack disrupting electricity and telephone networks, and evacuation and rehousing.[18]

During most of the 2014 Gaza conflict, gathering limits varied by distance from Gaza: more than 300 people were prohibited within seven kilometers, more than 500 between seven and 40 kilometers, and outdoor gatherings exceeding 1,000 between 40 and 80 kilometers.[1] These restrictions led to canceled weddings, cultural events, and sports games.[1] Civilian train service between Ashkelon and Sderot was suspended from July 18 to August 28 after intelligence indicated plans to target it with anti-tank missiles.[1]

The 2009 Reut Institute–Israel Trauma Coalition report judged that Operation Cast Lead in 2008–2009 showed improved cooperation among government agencies, the command, police, nongovernmental organizations, and Gaza-border municipalities compared with 2006.[3] A 2021 assessment similarly found that most local authorities were prepared during Operation Guardian of the Walls and cooperated successfully on civilian aspects of the campaign, although sheltering and evacuation gaps remained.[26]

The Civil Defense Law, 5711-1951, provides special IDF powers when Israel is attacked and when a “special situation on the home front” is declared because an attack on civilians is highly likely in all or part of the country.[27] The government may issue the declaration, or the defense minister may act if the government has not.[27] Approval by the Knesset Foreign Affairs and Defense Committee is required within five days; a ministerial declaration expires after 48 hours unless the government extends it to five days, with further extension requiring committee approval.[27]

Within a covered area, the IDF may require civilians to remain in shelters, prohibit or restrict educational activities, and control entry or exit to protect life or property.[27] These are available statutory powers, not measures necessarily used in every emergency.[27] The geographically and temporally limited home-front declaration is distinct from Israel’s broader general state of emergency, which has existed since 1948 with periodic Knesset extensions.[3]

On October 7, 2023, the defense minister declared a special home-front situation in the Gaza-border region at 8:00 a.m.[27] At 6:00 p.m., the national security minister declared a civil emergency event throughout Israel except within 80 kilometers of Gaza, where the special situation already applied.[27] At 8:00 p.m., the defense minister extended the home-front declaration nationwide, and on October 8 the government adopted Resolution 941 extending it.[27]

Civil-defense doctrine links reachable shelters, precisely targeted warnings, and prompt civilian response to instructions.[28] Together these measures can save lives while preserving political and military decision-makers’ freedom of action.[28] Sophisticated warning practices, reinforced rooms, and extensive procedures for moving civilians to shelters form important components of Israel’s homeland-security system.[29]

The broader resilience model identifies three complementary objectives: continuity of government, preservation of civilian routines and community resilience, and reduction of casualties and destruction.[3] This approach treats the ability to sustain institutions, services, and social functioning as part of protection rather than as a separate concern.[3] Sznajder presents the Gulf War as marking an important shift toward recognizing that individuals and families needed to prepare for survival when the civilian home front itself became an arena of warfare.[5]

The division of responsibility between military and civilian institutions has remained a recurring policy dispute.[10][11] The 1951 law addresses security emergencies rather than comprehensive emergency management, and efforts to enact broader legislation had not succeeded by the 2015–2016 assessment.[10] A 2015 audit found NEMA unable to enforce instructions on ministries; the authority responded that it had agreed a division of responsibilities with the Home Front Command and was developing a national scenario, a 2016–2020 readiness plan, and municipal training and operations centers.[30] The 2018 arrangement strengthened the command but left questions about military leadership of civilian systems and responsibility for nonmilitary disasters such as earthquakes.[11]

An INSS history has criticized HAGA’s limited resources and declining professional effectiveness before 1991, as well as unclear responsibility, weak coordination, and inadequate population preparedness in 2006.[2] Livne later characterized preparations for the Gulf War as being “according to the standards of World War II,” and the state comptroller criticized inadequate gas masks and other protection.[2][8] The 2009 resilience framework acknowledged disagreement over assessments of the 2006 response, cautioned that Cast Lead had not tested nationwide capacity, and criticized Turning Point 3 for insufficient attention to civil society and prolonged conflict.[3]

Access to physical protection is uneven.[26] In 2021, more than 60 percent of apartments lacked a safe room, and approximately 2.4 million residents, or 27 percent, lacked access to a shelter meeting national standards.[26] Neighborhood shelters served about 6 percent of residents and apartment-building shelters about 28 percent; more than 400,000 central-area apartments lacked internal shelters, while a 2019 northern-protection allocation exceeding $1 billion remained unimplemented.[26] A later estimate identified 100,000–200,000 apartments built between 1980 and 1992 without mamad rooms and outside eligibility for Tama 38 support.[31]

A 2025 account reported approximately 12,600 public shelters and cited a 2020 audit finding about 2,500 unfit for use and another 3,100 inadequately maintained.[31] Among 71 Arab local authorities examined, only 11 had public shelters; an estimated 120,000–150,000 Bedouin residents lacked protected rooms, public shelters, or portable alternatives.[31] From October 2023 through August 2025, the state installed 1,500 portable shelters, including about 550 in northern Arab and Druze communities, but the basic structures lacked doors and ventilation and fell below the command’s safety standards.[25]

Health facilities also faced protection gaps: a plan exceeding NIS 4 billion had received only about 10 percent of the proposed funding, while some central hospitals used underground parking areas as protected wards.[31] Sznajder also reports that historical equipment disputes involved protection for Palestinians in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria — and Gaza, where kit distribution began after a Supreme Court ruling requiring necessary protection under international law.[5] Reported Gulf War death totals differ because accounts include different direct and indirect consequences.[6][7]