Biometric Database Law (Israel)

Israel's biometric-document program was designed to replace vulnerable conventional identity documents with smart identity cards and biometric passports.[4] Its stated objective is to establish arrangements for verifying and identifying Israeli residents through biometric means, storing those data in identification documents and in a central database.[8] A 2008 government decision preceded the legislation and called for biometric identification documents and a national database. The State Comptroller described the program's objectives as secure identification, prevention of identity fraud and duplicate acquisition of documents, and provision of advanced digital government services.[4]

For enrollment, the system uses a facial image and two fingerprints that can be digitally measured and compared.[9][2] The law established the Biometric Database Management Authority to regulate and manage the central database.[1] The Authority adopted an ethics code committing it to lawful processing, security, protection of privacy, respect for human dignity, and use of only the minimal biometric data necessary for reliable identification and prevention of fraudulent use.[8]

Israel's Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, enacted in 1992, provides that all persons have a right to privacy and intimacy. It states that protected rights may be restricted only by a law befitting Israel's values, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent no greater than required.[10] These provisions constitute the constitutional privacy framework relevant to evaluating biometric-data legislation.[10]

The Israeli biometric project combined two initiatives from the outset: issuing biometric identification and travel documents to Israeli citizens and establishing a centralized database to store bodily identification data.[6] The original law provided for a two-year test period limited to residents who agreed in writing to participate.[3] Following an evaluation of the pilot's effects, the Interior Minister—after consultation with the Finance and Justice Ministers and approval by relevant ministerial and parliamentary committees—could cancel the database, extend the pilot, or implement the law for all residents.[3]

A 2011 implementation tender described the Biometric Database Management Authority as recently established.[2] A separate unit for developing biometric applications was established in the Prime Minister's Office in 2011 and was later placed under the National Cyber Directorate.[8] Issuance under the voluntary pilot began in June 2013, while an academic account dates the formal test period to July 8, 2013. The pilot was initially planned for two years and was later extended twice, with its conclusion expected in December 2016.[4][6]

A 2017 report cited by the Law Library of Congress stated that more than 1.1 million pieces of biometric data, including fingerprints and facial-recognition photographs, had been collected during the pilot and managed by the Databank Authority.[11] On February 27, 2017, the Knesset approved the amendment formalizing the permanent framework by a vote of 39 to 29.[5] The obligatory phase for biometric identification documents began for all residents in July 2017.[4]

Under the original 2009 law, biometric data were to be preserved under a security code and were not to include other personal information about each resident.[3] The law nevertheless permitted links between biometric data and identification numbers for purposes including crime prevention, investigation of serious offenses, confiscation of property connected with such offenses, identification of people or corpses, transfer of intelligence to enforcement authorities outside Israel, and legally authorized security duties.[3]

The 2011 implementation tender specified that an applicant's biometric data consisted of two flat fingerprints and a facial image, stored in the central database and embedded in the identity card and passport chip.[2] The primary matching purpose was to prevent duplicate enrollment. Later-stage purposes included identifying people in mass-casualty events, combating crime under legal restrictions, and identifying people without documents.[2]

During the test period, authorized access categories included Interior Ministry employees issuing identity documents, police officers, prison wardens, authorized Defense Authority employees, soldiers, Knesset security personnel, witness-protection guards, and other public employees legally responsible for identity verification.[12]

The 2017 arrangement established a permanent provision for a facial-image database and a temporary provision allowing residents to consent to retention of their fingerprints. Fingerprints of people under 16 were excluded from retention.[5] Both fingerprints are nevertheless scanned for the identity document's electronic chip and sent for comparison; if a resident does not consent to retention, the fingerprint images are deleted after comparison.[9] Residents who consent may later withdraw that consent and request deletion, although the document must be returned and revoked before a replacement is issued.[9]

The amendment barred police use of the database until implementing regulations were approved by the Knesset and required the head of the National Cyber Directorate to examine technological alternatives to fingerprints every eighteen months.[5] More generally, the 2011 implementation tender described crime-related access as limited, subject to court orders, and governed by Israeli legislation.[2]

The national program created an obligatory biometric-document system, but official audits found that its transition and digital-service goals remained incomplete. The 2023 State Comptroller report found that the transition cost NIS 935 million during 2009–2021.[4] As of July 2022, approximately 3.8 million residents held smart identity cards, while 45% of identity-card holders—about 3.2 million people—still held old-type cards.[4] Less than 1% of residents used a smart identity card to receive services through the National Identification System, and 92% of smart-card holders—approximately 3.5 million people—had cards whose use required a reader.[4]

A July 2022 Interior Ministry decision allowed identification documents valid for up to ten years to be issued regardless of consent to fingerprint retention.[9] The leaflet described fingerprint retention as a temporary mechanism established in 2017 for five years and extended through the end of June 2023, with an intended transition to a facial-image-only database.[9]

The State Comptroller reported that the law stipulated deletion of the retained fingerprints after the temporary order expired, but fingerprints were still stored as of December 2022.[4] Following the July 2022 change, fewer than 1% of applicants requested fingerprint storage: 197 of approximately 276,000 applicants during August–October 2022.[4]

The biometric project attracted sustained criticism from social organizations, intellectuals, and professional experts. Critics warned that it could produce comprehensive surveillance and harm citizens' privacy, drawing partly on the claim that similar initiatives had been rejected in most other democratic countries.[6] During the pilot, a petition signed by 74 senior Israeli university scientists described the database as vulnerable to hacking and data leakage and as a threat to privacy and state security.[13]

Opponents also questioned the program's core justification. Critics argued that collecting biometric data might not reduce document counterfeiting and might be useful mainly for verifying the identity of the person presenting a document.[8] Other concerns included the integration of biometric information with security or tracking cameras, wrongful identification, unauthorized access, secondary use, loss of control over personal information, and discrimination.[8] The Digital Rights Movement petitioned the High Court of Justice to declare the law unconstitutional, arguing that smart cards could operate without a central database and that universal enrollment effectively placed citizens on a list of potential suspects.[13]

On July 12, 2022, Israel's High Court of Justice dismissed petitions seeking to invalidate operation of the database.[7] The court found that the petitioners had not established the factual basis necessary for what it described as the "exceptional remedy of repeal of legislation."[7] Because millions of Israelis still held nonbiometric identification documents, the court found it difficult to assess the alleged harm at that stage. It dismissed rather than rejected the petitions, leaving the parties able to raise their arguments again in light of technological developments and future implementation.[7]

The Association for Civil Rights in Israel characterized the biometric-database policy as a violation of the right to privacy. NGO Monitor disputed that characterization and emphasized that courts, Knesset committees, and ministries had modified the program in response to privacy and human-rights concerns.[14]

Academic research published through the Ben-Gurion University Research Portal argues that biometric standards classified some people as "biometrically ineligible" and that those individuals were mostly members of underprivileged and marginalized groups.[15] Based on an analysis of 33 official Israeli state documents from the pilot, the study argues that standards were presented as scientific and objective in order to legitimize unequal treatment.[15]

The State Comptroller identified separate privacy and security concerns involving facial-image databases maintained by the Population Authority, including the Aviv population-registry and Rotem border-control systems. It found that their protection was weaker than that of the national database and that the issue remained unresolved as of October 2022.[4] In a broader commentary on Israeli surveillance law, SAPIR Journal argues that privacy protections under the Basic Law remain ambiguous, particularly in a political environment that tends to prioritize security.[16]