401st Brigade (Israel)

The 401st combines heavy armored units with reconnaissance and attached engineering forces, while its combat teams have also incorporated infantry from other brigades.[5][6] Its documented roles range from holding defensive lines and training tank crews to rapid armored advances, urban combat, and underground-infrastructure operations.[5][6] This history spans conventional armored battles in the Yom Kippur War and later combined operations involving tanks, infantry, engineers, and air support.[5][7]

The brigade belongs to the Armored Corps and is commonly identified with the 162nd Armored Division, also called the Ha-Plada, or Steel, Formation.[1][8] Its command relationships have varied by deployment: a general organizational description places it under Southern Command, while its troops operated under the 91st Division in southern Lebanon in March 2026.[9][10] An earlier organizational listing placed the 162nd Division under Central Command.[1]

The brigade’s battalions include the 46th, 52nd, and 9th, with the 601st Combat Engineering Battalion attached to it.[5] Its reconnaissance company, Palsar 401, scouts routes and helps identify targets for the armored formation.[11] These elements provide the organizational basis for a brigade whose reported combat operations have repeatedly combined armored maneuver with reconnaissance and engineering work.[5][11]

The brigade was established in the late 1960s to hold and strengthen the Suez Canal line; accounts date its creation to either 1967 or 1968.[1][5] During the War of Attrition, it trained tank crews who subsequently formed a substantial part of the reserve force that fought in the 1973 Yom Kippur War.[5] Its initial role thus combined responsibility for the canal front with the preparation of armored personnel for wider service.[5]

At the outbreak of the Yom Kippur War, the 401st confronted the Egyptian attack at the canal and suffered heavy casualties while helping hold the line.[1][5] Dan Shomron commanded the brigade during the war, leading it in battles to stop Egyptian forces in Sinai and later across the Suez Canal into Egypt.[12] The brigade subsequently participated in the encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army toward the end of the conflict.[13]

The experience of Avi Gur, a company deputy commander stationed at the Suez Canal when the war began, illustrates the command losses within the formation: after his company commander was killed, Gur assumed command.[13] His wartime account follows the brigade from fighting Egyptian forces on the southern front through the canal crossing and the final stages of the campaign.[13]

During the 1982 First Lebanon War, the brigade fought in Lebanon, and one of its battalions participated in the battle of Sultan Yaakov.[1] A unit history records that the brigade reached the outskirts of the Beirut–Damascus highway on the sixth day of the war.[5] Afterward, its routine security deployments included the Golan Heights, Gaza, the western sector of Israel’s security zone in southern Lebanon, and the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria.[5] Gaza and the West Bank were identified as its principal areas of activity at the time that unit history was published.[5]

Between 2004 and 2005, the brigade replaced its Magach tanks with Merkava Mark IVs.[1] The transition placed it among the formations operating an Israeli-designed fourth-generation tank introduced in 2002.[14] Alongside the 7th Brigade, the 401st was subsequently identified as one of the IDF’s Merkava IV-equipped tank brigades, built around heavy armored units intended for rapid maneuver warfare.[14]

In the 2006 Second Lebanon War, the 401st served as a regular armored brigade subordinate to the 162nd Armored Division.[15] Its reconnaissance company operated on foot in southern Lebanon, where one team was struck by an anti-tank missile and another moved to help evacuate the wounded.[11] An explosion killed Staff Sgt. Itai Steinberger, the first Palsar 401 soldier killed during an operation.[11] The company’s deputy commander explained that the soldiers had trained for that kind of warfare but had not previously experienced it, contrasting Lebanon’s open, difficult terrain with the West Bank environments familiar to them.[11]

After the Lebanon war, the brigade undertook three brigade-level exercises before Operation Cast Lead as part of a broader effort to improve ground-force readiness and apply lessons from the conflict.[16] During Cast Lead, under Col. Yigal Slovik, it advanced through the Netzarim corridor to the Gaza coast, dividing the Hamas-controlled territory into northern and southern blocs.[17] Its forces also raided Hamas terrorists and infrastructure.[17] Slovik said that the brigade had trained for the operation for two years and that 33 of its soldiers were lightly wounded during the fighting.[17]

Slovik linked his assessment of the operation to encounters with booby-trapped houses and buildings used as weapons caches, saying, “We did not destroy homes; we acted against terror infrastructure.”[17] He also described the presence of commanders alongside their soldiers as an important source of confidence for the troops.[17] The 401st later fought in the 2014 Gaza war and was among the armored brigades that sustained casualties, although the available account provides neither a brigade-specific total nor a detailed operational narrative.[18]

On October 7, 2023, the brigade was operating in northern Israel under Col. Benny Aharon, who had commanded it since May 2022.[2] Aharon ordered the brigade south before receiving an instruction from the IDF Operations Directorate, and tanks without transporters traveled on their tracks along Highway 6 and other major roads.[2] Brigade tanks fought in Be’eri, Kfar Aza, and other communities, and later fired on the Sderot police station held by Hamas terrorists.[2]

Master Sgt. Dar Cohen, a reservist in Company A of the 46th Battalion, recalled a journey of more than 12 hours across Israel in tanks to reach the Gaza-border area.[19] A father and son in a private vehicle helped guide the tanks along the route.[19] Near dawn, the group divided, with some soldiers heading toward Kfar Aza and others toward Yad Mordechai; Cohen described them as among the first organized reserve tanks to reach the area.[19] His account emphasized that the crew traveled south as tank soldiers rather than serving as infantry.[19]

The brigade entered Gaza on the evening of October 27, 2023, at the beginning of the ground offensive.[19] Cohen recalled the soldiers reciting Kiddush before entering and understanding themselves to be leading the ground advance.[19] The crossing took place in a combined operation with the Givati Brigade, and the first tank through the border fence belonged to the 401st, according to an IDF spokesperson quoted by mako.[2] Subsequent operations took the brigade through al-Atatra, Jabaliya, and Shati, followed by fighting in the Rimal neighborhood with Givati and cooperation with Shayetet 13.[2]

During the northern Gaza campaign, the brigade advanced along the coast and linked up with Israeli forces that entered Gaza port, according to FDD’s reporting.[20] In a November 10 operational update, the IDF said the brigade took the Haspina outpost, where arms-production facilities, launch sites, and an underground network were found and neutralized.[21] The IDF also described operations at the Blue Beach Hotel and the capture of the Bader outpost, which it identified as the Shati Battalion’s principal position.[21] The update put the number of Hamas terrorists killed during these activities at approximately 150.[21]

On the outskirts of Jabaliya, the IDF reported that troops found four deep tunnel shafts connected to a central shaft in a building associated with a senior Hamas operative.[22] It also reported that weapons, operational plans, and intelligence materials were found in civilian buildings, including bedrooms, and transferred to an Intelligence Directorate collection unit for examination and distribution to combat forces.[22] These operations were described while Col. Binyamin Aharon commanded the brigade.[22]

In January 2024, the IDF said the brigade raided the Al-Jabari outpost in Daraj Tuffah, a training complex containing a tunnel-training facility, an assault course, a swimming pool used for maritime-raid training, a mortar-and-weapons-fire simulator, and commanders’ offices.[23] The IDF said the structures were dismantled, along with a rocket-launcher compound and an anti-aircraft missile launch site.[23] The same operation reportedly uncovered a shaft connected to a two-kilometer tunnel.[23]

A February 2024 FDD report, relaying an IDF account, said the brigade participated in a 162nd Division operation in Shati alongside the 5th Reserve Infantry Brigade, Nahal, and special forces.[24] According to the report, the force crossed Gaza City, gained control of Shati within hours, raided infrastructure, seized weapons, and found and destroyed a Hamas data center beneath UNRWA headquarters.[24] In March, brigade forces joined Givati, Nahal, and Shayetet 13 in an operation at al-Shifa hospital.[2]

In April 2024, the brigade’s combat team built an engineering bridge across Wadi Gaza, which separates the northern and southern parts of the Strip, during an operation involving other forces under the 162nd Division.[7] According to the IDF account summarized by mako, the brigade crossed using two main bridges and employed engineering equipment to uncover an area containing launch pits and rockets prepared for firing toward Israel.[7] The IDF said the launchers were destroyed and that the operation also involved close combat and air support.[7]

By May, the brigade was operating east of Rafah and near the Philadelphi Corridor.[2] A June report relaying IDF statements said its forces destroyed a training compound used by Hamas’s Tel Sultan Battalion and located tunnel shafts, weapons storage, and offices associated with commanders.[25] In September, the IDF said brigade troops had killed more than 200 terrorists in Tel al-Sultan and found dozens of weapons in civilian structures.[26]

After months in Rafah, the brigade returned to northern Gaza in October 2024. Citing an IDF statement, FDD reported that it raided dozens of locations, seized weapons, and located and destroyed tunnel shafts.[27] On October 20, its commander, Col. Ahsan Daqsa, was killed in Jabaliya after leaving his tank with other officers to observe the area.[28] According to the IDF briefing, an explosive struck the group, seriously wounding the 52nd Battalion commander and injuring two other officers.[28]

Daqsa had taken command approximately four months earlier and had received a Chief of the General Staff Citation for evacuating wounded soldiers under fire during the Second Lebanon War.[28] Although off duty on October 7, 2023, he had gone south and led a counteroffensive near Erez Crossing.[29] Col. Meir Biderman was named his successor.[28] The incoming commander, previously a deputy commander of the 162nd Division, began issuing orders at 16:30 on the day Daqsa was killed and told battalion commanders there would be no command vacuum.[30]

In May 2025, the IDF reported that the brigade was operating under the 162nd Division in Operation Gideon’s Chariots.[31] During one encounter in northern Gaza, the IDF said soldiers advanced against a Hamas terrorist cell and killed several members within four minutes, after which an aircraft coordinated through the brigade’s Fire Control Center struck the remaining members.[31] A tank commander from the 52nd Battalion was seriously wounded in the encounter.[31]

In July 2025, the IDF said brigade combat engineers dismantled underground tunnels in Jabaliya measuring 2.7 kilometers in length and approximately 20 meters in depth.[32] In a separate account that month, the brigade commander said three kilometers of tunnels had been destroyed during a month in Jabaliya.[30] An August IDF account said the brigade had spent three months operating in Jabaliya and Daraj Tuffah, coordinating with the Israeli Air Force against structures, observation posts, and launch positions and working with Yahalom to dismantle dozens of tunnel shafts and several underground routes.[33]

In March 2026, an IDF live update said brigade troops operated in southern Lebanon under the 91st Division as part of a forward-defense posture.[10] It reported limited, targeted operations against Hezbollah infrastructure in evacuated areas, the discovery of weapons and materials it characterized as incitement materials in a structure used by Hezbollah operatives, and the dismantling of a weapons cache.[10] In August, The Jerusalem Post, citing IDF figures, reported that the brigade had completed an eight-month southern Lebanon mission combining border defense with operations in a security zone.[4] The stated results included 1,200 Hezbollah structures destroyed, more than 60 Hezbollah terrorists killed, over 600 weapons located, and hundreds of meters of tunnels destroyed.[4]

The brigade subsequently returned to southern Gaza after its Lebanon deployment.[34] An October 22, 2026, Ynet report described soldiers of the 9th Battalion deployed between Khan Younis and Rafah, eight kilometers from the border.[35]

The brigade’s core armored battalions—46, 52, and 9—operate alongside the attached 601st Combat Engineering Battalion and reconnaissance elements.[5] Wartime combat-team composition can extend beyond those units: a later Gaza formation combined the 52nd Armored Battalion and 601st Engineering Battalion with Nahal’s 50th Battalion and Givati’s Shaked Battalion.[6][30] This arrangement brought tank, infantry, and engineering units together within the same operational force.[6]

Palsar 401 was described in 2006 as one of the IDF’s newer and smaller special units, having been formed five years earlier.[11] Its wartime responsibilities included scouting routes and assisting the brigade in target identification, while its quieter-period operations took place in the Jordan Valley.[11] Its experience in southern Lebanon demonstrated that brigade reconnaissance could require dismounted movement and casualty evacuation under anti-tank missile fire rather than reconnaissance from armored vehicles alone.[11]

The brigade’s principal tank is the Merkava Mark IV, described in one account as weighing 60 tons.[19] Its tanks were also described in 2024 as equipped with the Trophy active-protection system.[3] The first Barak tanks reached the 52nd Battalion in the months before a 2023 report on their introduction; the new generation was intended gradually to replace older Merkava 4s.[3] These deliveries continued the brigade’s equipment transition that had begun with the replacement of Magach tanks in 2004–2005.[1][3]

The broader armored approach associated with the brigade emphasizes cooperation among tanks, infantry, artillery, and other forces.[14] Its recent operations illustrate several applications of that approach: infantry participated in combined urban combat teams, engineers built crossings over Wadi Gaza and dismantled tunnels, and air operations were coordinated through the brigade’s Fire Control Center.[6][7] Cooperation with specialist formations also included Shayetet 13 in Gaza and Yahalom during underground-infrastructure operations.[2][33]

Training and sustained deployment have been recurring features of the brigade’s operational history.[16][30] The three brigade-level exercises conducted between the 2006 Lebanon War and Cast Lead preceded a campaign for which its commander said the unit had prepared for two years.[16][17] During the later Gaza war, its commander described the brigade as having spent more cumulative time inside Gaza than any other brigade, while the same account said it had received only a ten-day refresh leave since October 7, 2023.[6][30]

The brigade’s connection to the Yom Kippur War has remained part of its commemorative life.[36] In an IDF remembrance project, three serving 401st soldiers stood at attention and saluted the graves of brigade soldiers killed in 1973.[36] Two soldiers pictured in that ceremony, Staff Sgt. Itay Saadon and Staff Sgt. Ofir Berkovich, later fell in northern Gaza, Saadon in November 2023 and Berkovich in October 2024.[36]

The brigade’s losses in the Gaza war included personnel from the 52nd, 46th, and 9th battalions and the 601st Combat Engineering Battalion, with deaths recorded in northern, central, and southern Gaza during 2023–2025.[8] A late-2023 Ynet tally counted 13 brigade members killed during the ground campaign to that point, including regular-service and reserve soldiers.[37] An October 22, 2026, Ynet report gave a cumulative tally of 58 brigade soldiers lost during ground operations in Gaza and Lebanon, including Daqsa and the commander of the 52nd Battalion.[35]

In southern Lebanon on June 19, 2026, Lt. Col. Dor Gedalia Ben Simhon, commander of the 52nd Battalion, fell in combat along with several other members of the battalion.[8] Other 2026 casualties in southern Lebanon included members of the 9th Battalion and the 601st Combat Engineering Battalion.[8] These losses extended the brigade’s record of service and sacrifice across both theaters.[8]

The unit’s recent history also includes individual accounts of initiative and continuity of command: the southward movement ordered on October 7 before formal direction arrived, the reserve crews’ long drive to the border, and the immediate assumption of command after Daqsa’s death.[2][30] During the southern Lebanon mission, brigade commander Col. Yoav Schneider described the objective as pushing threats away from Israeli civilians.[4]

Accounts of the brigade’s experience at Wadi Saluki in 2006 differ in specificity and framing: one characterizes its movement under Hezbollah anti-tank missile fire as a “rash retreat,” while an order-of-battle table leaves its operational area unknown and associates Saluki Gorge with the 162nd Division rather than expressly with the brigade.[15][38] The former account uses the episode to support adapting armored vehicles and formations to changing battlefield technology.[38]

Many reported operational outcomes in Gaza and Lebanon—including terrorist death counts, the identification of military facilities, and quantities of infrastructure destroyed—originate in IDF statements or commanders’ accounts rather than independent verification.[24][26] The claim of being first into Gaza also appears both in a reservist’s recollection and in reporting about the first tank to cross the fence; it should not be expanded into a claim that the brigade alone initiated every aspect of the ground offensive.[2][19] Casualty totals likewise concern different dates and scopes: the late-2023 figure of 13 and the October 22, 2026, figure of 58 are dated tallies, not competing totals for the same period.[35][37]