2025 in Israel

Israel entered 2025 amid the continuing war with Hamas and a hostage crisis that made the return of captives a central public and political concern. Negotiations mediated by the United States, Qatar, and Egypt produced a January agreement intended to pause fighting and begin phased hostage releases. Its first phase was set for 42 days, with later phases envisaging further releases, Israeli withdrawals, an intended permanent end to the war, and reconstruction. The agreement’s terms and strategic consequences were disputed in Israel, including whether the arrangement would be fully implemented and how it would affect the government’s war aims.[1][2][11]

The war also shaped domestic politics. The ceasefire put pressure on Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu’s governing coalition: Itamar Ben-Gvir and his party resigned after Netanyahu secured cabinet approval of the deal, leaving a narrow majority, while Bezalel Smotrich remained after assurances that Israeli forces would intensify operations in the West Bank and later resume fighting in Gaza. Disagreement over military conscription of ultra-Orthodox men remained another threat to coalition cohesion.[12]

The year’s other central security development was the confrontation with Iran. In June, Israel attacked Iranian nuclear and military targets after negotiations over a new nuclear agreement faltered. The resulting 12-day conflict included Iranian missile attacks on Israel and U.S. strikes on Iranian nuclear facilities.[5][6]

In parallel, arguments about judicial oversight, the authority of government officials, and the conduct of the Gaza war grew more acute as the government confronted legal challenges and public protests.[13]

The first Israel–Hamas ceasefire of the year took effect on January 19, after an announced agreement on January 15. Its initial phase called for a halt to hostilities lasting 42 days, the phased release of 33 Israeli hostages, the release of Palestinian prisoners and detainees, more humanitarian aid entering Gaza, Israeli redeployment from populated areas, and the return of displaced Palestinians to northern Gaza. The stated framework also provided for later negotiations on additional releases, further Israeli withdrawals, and a possible permanent end to the war.[1][2]

The start was delayed after Israel said it had not received the names of the hostages scheduled for release. Once it began, three Israeli women—Romi Gonen, Emily Damari, and Doron Steinbrecher—were returned on the first day. Israel released 90 Palestinian prisoners in that initial exchange, and 90 Palestinian security prisoners were taken to Betunia in the West Bank. The first phase envisaged 33 hostage releases, although accounts differ in how they describe the total eventually released and the categories included.[14][15]

Four Israeli female soldiers were released on January 25 in exchange for 200 Palestinian prisoners. After a dispute over the release order of an Israeli civilian hostage, Israeli forces withdrew from parts of the Netzarim Corridor on January 27, allowing displaced Palestinians to return north. More than 300,000 had returned by that date, according to the Meir Amit Center. The arrangement also brought a substantial increase in humanitarian supplies, although the pace and extent of aid delivery became a point of dispute.[16][16]

By the close of the ceasefire’s first phase, 33 Israeli hostages and five Thai nationals had been released, while Israel had freed nearly 2,000 Palestinians from its prisons. The five Thai hostages were not part of the agreement’s specified releases. The first phase ended without agreement on the next phase, and negotiations had not begun by the March 2 end date identified in reporting on the agreement.[2]

The pause in Gaza fighting coincided with Israeli operations in the West Bank — known by its original, indigenous Jewish name of Judea and Samaria. On January 21, the IDF and Shin Bet announced Operation Iron Wall, a major counterterrorism operation in Jenin intended, according to military sources, to neutralize terror infrastructure and imminent threats and preserve Israeli freedom of action. Israeli forces operated in Jenin and nearby areas; Palestinian health officials reported at least 10 people killed and 40 wounded at the operation’s outset. Britannica reported that Israeli forces deployed tanks in Jenin and Tulkarm in February for the first time in decades and that residents were expelled from three refugee camps in those towns.[17][2]

The truce broke down in March. The parties differed over whether to extend the first phase or move to negotiations on a second phase, which was intended to address a more comprehensive agreement. Israel renewed its blockade of humanitarian aid and cut off electricity to Gaza, according to Britannica, while talks involving Hamas and the United States considered hostage releases and a broader end to the war. Fighting resumed on March 18, when Israel renewed airstrikes. Accounts attribute the collapse to different factors: the CIE timeline says Hamas refused either to release additional hostages or to extend the first phase, while the AJC account describes Israel’s position that it could not proceed to phase-two negotiations and notes that some Israeli families and critics questioned the government’s motives and handling of the war.[15][13]

Britannica reported that more than 400 people were killed in the March 18 bombardment and that Israeli forces moved the following day to retake the Netzarim Corridor. It also connected the decision to resume fighting to pressure from coalition allies and an approaching budget deadline. These descriptions form part of differing accounts of responsibility for the collapse of the truce and the decisions that followed. After the fighting resumed, Itamar Ben-Gvir’s Otzma Yehudit party and its ministers returned to the governing coalition on March 18, having left in January to protest the ceasefire agreement.[2][18]

Israel launched Operation Gideon’s Chariots in Gaza in May, with the stated aims of returning hostages and dismantling Hamas militarily and politically. The Meir Amit Center dates the start of the ground and air operation to May 18 and says it targeted Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad personnel and infrastructure. The first reported aid trucks entered Gaza on May 19 after crossings had been closed in March: the center reported that five UN trucks entered, while Hamas’s media office said that only nine trucks carrying food for children had been allowed in. An INSS analysis raised concerns about the unclear scope of the operation, the scale and duration of evacuation, and the proposed system for aid distribution; these were analytical concerns, not a court ruling.[19][20]

A further ceasefire was signed in Sharm el-Sheikh, Egypt, on October 9 and took effect on October 10, following indirect negotiations mediated by the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey. It was framed as the first phase of a broader plan proposed by U.S. President Donald Trump and was intended to facilitate implementation of a 20-point framework for Gaza. Israel began an initial withdrawal from Gaza, and reporting described its forces as moving to positions controlling about half the territory. The agreement called for a ceasefire, hostage releases, troop withdrawal to an agreed line, expanded humanitarian aid, and Palestinian prisoner releases; it did not settle all questions about Gaza’s future.[21][4]

On October 13, Hamas returned the 20 living hostages still held in Gaza. Israel released nearly 2,000 Palestinian prisoners and detainees; reporting on the terms specified 250 people sentenced to life imprisonment and more than 1,700 Gazans detained during the war who were not involved in the October 7 attack. The deal also called for the return of the bodies of deceased hostages. Four bodies were returned in the initial exchange, and by the end of October the Meir Amit Center reported that 17 had been returned while 11 remained in Gaza. Reports differ in how they describe the total number of bodies expected and the precise terms and status of their return.[21][3]

The ceasefire remained fragile. Israeli forces were attacked in Rafah on October 19 and 28, followed by Israeli strikes; the Meir Amit Center reported three Israeli soldiers killed in Gaza during October. By November, the UN Security Council had adopted Resolution 2803, endorsing the broader plan and authorizing transitional and international presences in Gaza through the end of 2027. The ceasefire and hostage release ended a phase of intense fighting but left governance, disarmament, reconstruction, security arrangements, and the full implementation of the agreement unresolved.[3][4]

Israel launched Operation Rising Lion against Iranian nuclear, missile, and military targets on June 13, beginning a 12-day confrontation. One timeline dates the operation’s launch to June 12, while other accounts date the Israeli attack to June 13, the night of June 12–13. Britannica says the opening operation involved 200 Israeli fighter jets striking more than 100 targets and killing senior military commanders and nuclear scientists. Other reporting describes airstrikes and covert action against nuclear facilities, missile infrastructure, and military leadership.[22][23]

Iran retaliated with waves of ballistic missiles and drones aimed at Israel. Attacks caused civilian deaths and damage to residential buildings, while sirens, shelter warnings, school closures, and the closure of Israeli airspace disrupted daily life. The Congressional Research Service reported more than 600 people killed in Iran and 29 in Israel during the conflict, while other Israeli casualty counts differed and were revised over time. Israeli health officials reported 28 deaths and more than 3,000 wounded when the ceasefire took effect; a later year-end account gave 33 deaths and more than 3,500 injuries. These are time-specific reports rather than a single consistently stated tally.[6][24][25]

The United States entered the conflict on June 22, striking Iranian nuclear facilities at Fordow, Natanz, and Isfahan. Britannica describes the operation as involving B-2 bombers and GBU-57 bunker-buster bombs. The extent of damage remained disputed: a preliminary, low-confidence U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency assessment said the program had been set back only months, while CIA Director John Ratcliffe later said new information indicated severe damage that would take years to rebuild. The Congressional Research Service likewise cautioned that the damage to the facilities and the effect on Iran’s capabilities remained unclear. INSS assessed that Iran’s nuclear program had been significantly set back, but noted that Natanz and Fordow might not have been totally destroyed and that enriched uranium could have been retained or relocated.[23][5]

A ceasefire was announced for June 24, ending the most intense phase of the fighting. The conflict is generally described in the sources as a 12-day war.[5][6] The operational aims are described in distinct ways: the CIE timeline calls the Israeli action preemptive and says regime change was not an objective, while the Congressional Research Service reports that Netanyahu said during the conflict that regime change was a possible outcome. These accounts distinguish stated operational aims from a possible consequence, but present different descriptions of the issue.[15][6]

The immediate effects in Israel included deaths, thousands of injuries, displacement, and extensive property damage. CTech reported that Iran launched roughly 550 ballistic missiles and about 1,000 drones, that 11,200 people were displaced, and that the Home Front Command issued more than 21,000 civilian alerts. It reported about 39,000 property-damage claims, an estimated NIS 5 billion in damage, and a projected cost of at least NIS 9 billion to the Tax Authority’s compensation fund. A contemporaneous Times of Israel report said more than 9,000 people had been displaced by the time the ceasefire took effect, illustrating how estimates changed as the conflict and its aftermath were assessed.[26][24]

INSS characterized the campaign’s outcome as “concluded but not resolved.” An analysis by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs described the ceasefire as brokered by the United States without a formal political agreement or oversight mechanism. In July, IDF Chief of Staff Eyal Zamir said Israel had disrupted Iran’s nuclear and missile programs and needed to remain vigilant; the same account reported plans to accelerate Arrow missile production and raise the readiness of Iron Dome and David’s Sling air-defense systems. Such assessments and plans were presented as Israeli security judgments, not as proof that the underlying Iranian capabilities had been eliminated.[27][28]

September brought a major diplomatic initiative focused on a two-state solution. The UN General Assembly adopted the New York Declaration by 142 votes in favor, 10 against, and 12 abstentions, according to the Meir Amit Center. On September 21, the United Kingdom, Canada, Portugal, and Australia announced recognition of a Palestinian state; France, Belgium, Luxembourg, Malta, Monaco, and Andorra followed on September 22. The center put the total number of states recognizing Palestine at 159 of the 193 UN members.[29]

Recognition was politically contested. The same account records both supportive responses and criticism, including the U.S. description of recognition as a “reward for Hamas.” The declarations formed part of a wider diplomatic argument over the timing and effect of recognition on negotiations, rather than constituting agreement on the unresolved terms of a political settlement.[29]

On September 9, Israel launched airstrikes in Doha targeting Hamas leaders. The CIE timeline reports that several associates were killed but the intended targets were not. Qatar denounced the strike as “state terrorism,” and President Trump said it did not advance Israeli or American goals. The attack took place in Qatar, a key U.S. partner, and became a sensitive issue in Israel’s regional relations.[15]

The October ceasefire involved the United States, Egypt, Qatar, and Turkey as mediators and formed part of a larger proposed framework for Gaza. The November UN Security Council resolution endorsing the plan authorized transitional and international presences through the end of 2027. These developments established an international framework for the next phase but did not, by themselves, resolve questions of governance, reconstruction, security, or the political status of Gaza.[21][4]

The attempted dismissal of Shin Bet chief Ronen Bar became one of the year’s most consequential domestic disputes. Netanyahu announced plans to remove Bar in March, and the government decided on March 20 to dismiss him. Bar said he intended to leave office on June 15, and the government canceled its dismissal decision on April 29. Bar resigned in late April, with his departure set for June 15, while the controversy unfolded alongside a Shin Bet investigation into Qatargate and disagreements over accountability for the October 7 attacks.[7][30]

The High Court of Justice ruled on May 21, by a 2–1 majority, that the dismissal was unlawful. The majority cited, among other issues, the bypassing of an advisory committee, an insufficient factual basis, denial of a hearing, and a conflict of interest involving the prime minister. The dissent considered the case moot after the government withdrew its decision. Justice Isaac Amit’s opinion stated that “Maintaining the rule of law is a necessary condition for ensuring the security and resilience of the State of Israel—and this holds true even in times of emergency.”[7]

The political dispute involved competing explanations. Netanyahu cited “persistent personal and professional distrust” of Bar; critics viewed the move as politically motivated and connected to investigations involving the prime minister’s office.[13] A separate commentary presented the opposing claims of Netanyahu’s supporters, who accused Bar of seeking to undermine the prime minister and deflect responsibility for failures preceding the October 7 attacks, and Bar, who argued that the government had no right to fire him while he was investigating alleged wrongdoing by Netanyahu and his staff. These claims were allegations and political interpretations, not findings established by the court’s ruling.[31]

The controversy broadened with Qatargate, a scandal involving allegations that aides close to Netanyahu promoted Qatari interests in Israeli media in exchange for payment. The reported connection between the investigation and Bar’s dismissal intensified public argument about political interests, security institutions, and the independence of investigations. The sources describe allegations and legal disputes; they do not establish the alleged conduct as fact.[32]

The government also moved against Attorney General Gali Baharav-Miara. In March, the cabinet unanimously passed a no-confidence motion and began a process aimed at ending her term. Justice Minister Yariv Levin described the action as a response to a breakdown in cooperation, while Baharav-Miara argued that the proposal would make the government the interpreter of the law and weaken checks on its power. The dispute prompted a large demonstration in Jerusalem and formed part of wider disagreement over the government’s relationship with the legal system.[33]

On March 27, the Knesset passed a law changing the Judicial Selection Committee’s composition and voting arrangements. The nine-member committee would no longer include two representatives of the Israel Bar Association; instead, lawyers chosen separately by coalition and opposition factions would take their places. The bill passed 67–1 after opposition members boycotted the vote, and the new system was scheduled to take effect with the next Knesset. Proponents described the change as a way to curb what they viewed as Supreme Court overreach, while opponents argued it would politicize judicial appointments and weaken judicial independence. The Association for Civil Rights in Israel petitioned the Supreme Court against the law.[34][8]

Protests also addressed the government’s handling of the Gaza war, the hostage crisis, and attempts to remove Bar and Baharav-Miara. These issues fed into a wider disagreement over judicial oversight, government authority, national security, and the relationship between political and state interests. AJC reported that some Israeli families and critics challenged the government’s motives and conduct in the war, while the government’s actions were defended by its supporters as security and governance decisions.[13]

The Knesset approved the 2025 state budget on March 25, one week before the legal deadline after which failure to pass a budget would have led to new elections. It passed by 66 votes to 52 and set spending at approximately NIS 620 billion, with a planned deficit of 4.9% of GDP. Demonstrators protested outside the Knesset, where six were arrested.[35] An INSS analysis characterized it as the largest state budget to date and criticized its effects on working people, citing higher National Insurance contributions, frozen income-tax brackets, fewer paid convalescence days, an increase in VAT, and across-the-board cuts to education, health, and welfare. These distributional judgments were the institute’s analysis, while the budget figures were the reported fiscal framework.[36]

Wartime spending put additional strain on public finances. A May report said that the expanded Gaza campaign prompted large reserve call-ups and pressured a defense budget that had assumed a gradual reduction in security operations. It gave a reserve-service allocation of NIS 15–17 billion and said only NIS 3 billion remained in a NIS 10 billion contingency fund.[37] The war’s cost was also reflected in estimates published in commentary: one article put the first three days of the June Iran conflict at NIS 5.5 billion, or more than $1.5 billion, and cited an end-of-2024 estimate of NIS 141.6 billion in direct costs for the Gaza and Lebanon wars, excluding indirect costs and compensation for damage from Iranian attacks.[38]

The conscription dispute also affected the coalition. United Torah Judaism formally resigned from the government on July 15 after negotiations over the military service of ultra-Orthodox men broke down, leaving the coalition with 61 of 120 Knesset seats.[39]

Hostages and the war remained central to public debate throughout the year. A July 2025 Tel Aviv University Peace Index survey found that 65% of the Israeli public preferred hostage release as the government’s primary war objective, compared with 28% who preferred eliminating Hamas by any means. Views varied strongly by political alignment: among coalition supporters, 47% prioritized hostage release and 53% favored eliminating Hamas; among opposition voters, 88% prioritized hostage release.[40]

The survey also recorded differing preferences for Gaza’s future. Among Jewish respondents, 58% supported continued Israeli security control and 53% backed civilian administration by international and regional forces; 32% favored Israeli civilian governance. The responses reflected distinct questions about military security and civilian administration, not one single alternative arrangement.[40]

The return of the Bibas family’s bodies and their burial became a defining moment of public mourning. Shiri Bibas and her young sons Ariel and Kfir were buried together at Tzohar Cemetery on February 26. Their husband and father, Yarden Bibas, had been released from captivity on February 1 and spoke at the funeral. Thousands lined the route to the cemetery; a year-end account described hundreds of thousands gathering in streets, squares, and along roads during the procession, carrying orange balloons, flags, or Batman dolls. The public gathering was described as both mourning and a civic expression of grief over the family’s abduction and deaths.[41][25]

The government’s handling of the war and the hostage crisis was a focus of demonstrations, as were the proposed dismissals of Bar and Baharav-Miara and changes to judicial appointments. These issues were connected in public debate: arguments about security decisions overlapped with concerns about accountability, legal checks on executive power, and the independence of state institutions.[8][13]

Israeli singer Yuval Raphael finished second at the Eurovision Song Contest in Basel, receiving 357 points, behind Austria’s JJ, who won with 436. Raphael ranked fourteenth in the jury vote but first in the public vote. Her participation took place amid protests that intensified in the lead-up to the contest.[42]

Israel’s population passed 10 million during 2025. The Central Bureau of Statistics estimated the population at 10.178 million on December 31: 7.771 million Jews and others, 2.147 million Arabs, and approximately 260,000 foreign residents. It estimated growth during the year at 1.1%, about 112,000 people, and recorded roughly 182,000 births and a negative international migration balance of about 20,000. The bureau said its year-end estimates were preliminary and included foreign residents in Israel.[9]

Net migration reflected substantial departures as well as returns. The CBS reported that 69,300 Israelis left the country during the year and 19,000 returned, under criteria that included spending 275 days abroad during the year and three consecutive months abroad at the start. A separate estimate by the Taub Center put population growth at about 0.9% using January–September data and described it as the lowest since Israel’s establishment. The later CBS full-year figure of 1.1% used a different period and measurement basis.[43][44]

Jewish residents made up a substantial share of both Israel’s population and the worldwide Jewish population. A JPR article reported 7.2 million Jewish residents in April 2025, equal to 46% of Jews worldwide, and said population growth in recent years had occurred primarily through natural growth. Jewish Virtual Library figures for the full year likewise described growth at 1.1%, attributing the slowdown to rising mortality as the population aged, negative net migration, and declining fertility.[45][46]

The number of immigrants moving to Israel fell compared with the previous year. Jewish Virtual Library reported 22,522 immigrants in 2025, about 31% fewer than in 2024. It also described a shift in the origins of arrivals: immigration from Western countries rose, while immigration from the former Soviet Union, particularly Russia, declined.[46]

The economy grew despite the disruption of military operations and reserve mobilization. The Ministry of Finance’s government debt report put overall growth at 2.9% for 2025, with average unemployment of 2.9% compared with 3.0% in 2024, and inflation of 2.6% compared with 3.2%. Jewish Virtual Library reported growth of 3.1% and a 1.7% rise in GDP per capita to approximately $56,460. The Central Bureau of Statistics’ initial assessment also put growth at 3.1%, while describing the figure as based on partial data.[47][46]

The annual result concealed sharp changes during the year. The CBS’s initial estimate showed a 4.3% annualized contraction in the second quarter amid the Iran war and reserve mobilization, followed by annualized growth of 12.7% in the third quarter and 4% in the fourth. The Ministry of Finance report also described a sharp third-quarter recovery, giving an annualized quarterly growth rate of 12.3%. The estimates differ slightly, but both report a steep rebound after the second-quarter shock. Information and communications grew 4.7% over the year, fixed-asset investment rose 8.1%, and exports excluding diamonds and startups increased 6.1%.[48][47]

The June war affected economic activity and growth in the second quarter, while military expenditure added to budget pressure. The March budget set planned spending at about NIS 620 billion and a deficit of 4.9% of GDP.[35] INSS argued that tax and benefit measures placed burdens on working people and that cuts affected education, health, and welfare; the institute also linked economic concerns to renewed Gaza fighting and political instability. These are the report’s evaluative conclusions, distinct from the budget’s stated totals.[36]

High-tech investment continued during wartime. A November SAPIR Journal article reported that Google struck a $32 billion deal in March to acquire Israeli-founded cybersecurity company Wiz, and that Nvidia announced in July a multibillion-dollar technology campus to expand its Israeli operations. The article presented these as signs of continuing high-tech activity alongside wartime economic pressures; its account and judgments are commentary.[38]

Israel experienced exceptionally hot and dry conditions in 2025. The Israel Meteorological Service reported that the year was 1.1°C warmer than the 1991–2020 average and ranked fifth-warmest in its measurement series beginning in 1950. During an August heatwave, the Gilgal station recorded 49.7°C, a station record and the second-highest temperature recorded nationwide since the state’s establishment.[10]

The 2024–25 rainy season was characterized as an extreme drought. About 55% of average precipitation fell in non-desert regions. In the Northern Mountains and Hula Valley, rainfall was around 40%–45% of average, while parts of Mount Hermon and the Northern Golan received 35%–40%, described by the Meteorological Service as unprecedented there in roughly a century.[10]

On April 30, wildfires in the Jerusalem Hills forced evacuations and closures of roads and rail service. Communities including Neve Shalom, Beko’a, Ta’oz, and Nachshon were evacuated, and Route 1 and other roads were closed. Firefighters deployed 163 crews, 21 all-terrain vehicles, and an aircraft; 12 firefighters were initially reported lightly injured, with the number later updated to 17. Strong winds and low humidity complicated the response, and Israel sought international firefighting assistance.[49][50]

The Meteorological Service reported that the fire spread amid a heatwave and strong winds, burned nearly 20,000 dunams, and contributed to the cancellation of official ceremonies, including the Independence Day ceremony.[10] A later Ynet account attributed the rapid spread to severe dryness and winds and said the fire began in Eshtaol Forest following civilian negligence near Moshav Tarum. That account estimated that approximately 6,500 dunams burned in Eshtaol Forest and another 6,000 in Canada Park, for about 12,500 dunams in total, with restoration expected to take several years.[51] A contemporaneous preliminary estimate put the affected area at about 11,700 dunams; these were estimates published at different stages of the emergency.[50]

A separate fire the previous week had burned 10,000 dunams, according to the Fire and Rescue Service, as reported by the Times of Israel. Together, the fires and broader drought underscored the practical effects of the year’s hot, dry conditions on communities, transport, natural areas, and public ceremonies.[49][10]

The year ended with formal cessations of hostilities but without durable peace, in the assessment of INSS. Its retrospective described erosion in Israel’s international standing and growing diplomatic isolation alongside rising global antisemitism and deepening polarization within Israeli politics and society. Those judgments framed 2025 as a year in which military agreements reduced immediate fighting in several arenas without resolving the underlying conflicts.[27]

The same retrospective noted that the National Security Strategy Law completed its legislative passage in 2025. It requires the government to formulate and present a long-term national security strategy and establishes parliamentary oversight. The law created a formal planning and oversight requirement against the backdrop of a year shaped by multiple security fronts and debate about the proper relationship between government authority, legal institutions, and national security.[27]

Retrospective accounts agreed on the broad sequence of events but differed on several important details. Sources dated the opening of Operation Rising Lion to June 12 or June 13 and used different Israeli casualty totals as figures were revised after the fighting.[22][23] Accounts of the March collapse of the Gaza truce also emphasized different factors, including Hamas’s refusal to release additional hostages, Israel’s negotiating position, and domestic political pressures on the government.[15][13]

The year’s central developments remained linked: Gaza ceasefires and hostage releases were repeatedly shaped by military and coalition calculations; the Iran conflict demonstrated both Israel’s capacity to strike distant targets and the limits of what could be confidently concluded about the effects; and domestic arguments over accountability and the judiciary accompanied each phase. By year’s end, the October agreement had returned the living hostages, though the fate of the final hostage body remained unsettled, while the Israel–Iran ceasefire had paused the fighting without resolving questions about Iran’s nuclear capabilities.[30][5]