2024 Israeli Operation in the Northern West Bank

The operation followed a series of improvised explosive device (IED) incidents targeting Israeli forces and civilians in the West Bank. An August 18, 2024, attack in Tel Aviv wounded an Israeli civilian with a powerful IED; other reporting described it as an attempted suicide bombing whose device exploded prematurely, killing the bomber and wounding a passerby.[3][5] Israeli officials suspected that the attempted bombing had been staged from the Tulkarm area, and the attack was cited as part of the context for the operation.[6]

The IDF said it chose a larger campaign after smaller operations because it assessed that terrorist operatives were working across Jenin, Tulkarm, and Far’a. The stated Israeli aim was to disrupt the networks and infrastructure used to plan and carry out attacks. Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi described the objective as entering refugee camps, destroying sabotage capabilities, and thwarting terrorist attacks.[3] Senior officers also presented the campaign as a way to establish operational freedom for future action.[7][2]

The Congressional Research Service placed the major Israeli operation in the northern West Bank in August and September 2024 amid heightened Israeli fears that attacks originating in the area could become another front. Its report did not give an operation name, exact dates, or operation-specific casualty figures. In broader context, it said militants reportedly spent most of their time on defensive measures and lacked the “discipline, structure and rocket arsenals” of Hamas or Hezbollah. That contextual description is not an assessment of the campaign’s results.[8]

The CRS report also relayed a broader reported Israeli aim of preventing militants in the northern West Bank from establishing command centers, explosives laboratories, and underground facilities. It attributed that account to a July 2024 newspaper report rather than identifying it as a specific statement of purpose for the August–September campaign.[8] Separately, the U.S. Department of State described Israeli security forces as frequently entering the West Bank for counterterrorism operations, including arrests of suspected terrorists that often led to clashes with Palestinian militants, without detailing this particular campaign.[9]

The operation began overnight on August 27–28, with large-scale raids launched on August 28, 2024. Israeli forces entered Jenin, Nur Shams near Tulkarm, and Far’a near Tubas. The IDF called the campaign “Summer Camps” (מבצע מחנות קיץ), and said its goal was to dismantle Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist infrastructure in the area.[1][2]

The operation involved the IDF, Border Police, and Shin Bet. Reporting described participation by the IDF’s Duvdevan special forces and Kfir Brigade, and said a Kfir Brigade combat team led the operation alongside Yamam, Shin Bet, Border Police, and other IDF forces. One account described hundreds of troops and sustained, unusually broad air support, contrasting the brigade-sized deployment with the smaller forces typically used in West Bank village raids.[6][10]

The campaign’s name and boundaries are described differently across sources. The Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center distinguishes three named operations: “Summer Camps” in Jenin and its environs, “Ir Shemesh” in Nur Shams, and “Olim Kita” in Far’a.[3] FDD, by contrast, uses “Operation Summer Camps” for a ten-day campaign spanning Jenin, Tulkarm, and Far’a.[11] Other reporting says the IDF used “Summer Camps” for the simultaneous campaign across those locations.[2]

These accounts may reflect different uses of the name rather than a single agreed definition of the campaign. The CRS report refers more generally to a major operation against militants in the northern West Bank during August and September, without naming it. For clarity, this article uses “the operation” or “the campaign” for the broader series of activity, while identifying local actions by name where the sources do so.[8]

At the start of the offensive, Israeli forces blockaded roads around Jenin, Tulkarm, and Far’a, and ground troops and aerial vehicles entered the areas. The forces targeted roads suspected of containing explosives, while access to hospitals was controlled on the stated grounds that wanted individuals might use them to hide or flee. Israeli reporting described operations focused on refugee camps, nearby communities, and routes believed to contain IEDs.[6][12]

The Jenin-area action began on August 28. Israeli forces first operated in the city’s eastern neighborhood and Kasbah, then expanded into Jenin refugee camp; the operation also covered Qabatiya and al-Sila al-Harithiya.[3] The IDF said it was continuing in Jenin after activity in Nur Shams and Far’a had concluded.[7] FDD later described the Jenin operation as a ten-day effort that had concluded by September 6,[11] while other reporting said the wider campaign had not ended and forces could return.[1]

“Ir Shemesh,” in Nur Shams refugee camp, is dated August 28–30 in the account that uses that name. The same account says the operation ended on August 30. “Olim Kita,” in Far’a refugee camp, lasted about 30 hours and ended on August 29. Reports from the opening phase also describe an air operation near Far’a in which four armed men were killed, as well as the dismantling of explosives planted beneath roads.[3]

At Nur Shams, Israeli forces reportedly killed five operatives, detained six wanted persons, and found and destroyed dozens of IEDs. In Far’a, the reported finds included an IED laboratory, an operations room in a mosque, ready-to-use IEDs, and weapons; four operatives were reported killed. In the opening days, reporting also described raids and airstrikes around Tulkarm, the discovery of explosives and weapons laboratories, and arrests in Nur Shams and the Jordan Valley.[3][13]

In Jenin, the IDF reported that it neutralized more than 30 explosive devices planted beneath roads, seized weapons, and destroyed an explosives laboratory and a weapons depot beneath a mosque. The military said it had removed or damaged sections of camp roads to search for explosives placed under or beside them.[7] Other reporting described a bomb-making laboratory demolished in Tulkarm and relayed the military’s account that a bomb had been found hidden in a baby carriage.[14]

A distinctive episode occurred on August 30, when Israeli forces killed Wissam Hazem in an airstrike on a vehicle in the Jenin area. The Meir Amit center identified Hazem as a Hamas operative and named Maysara Masharqa and Arafat Amer as two other Hamas operatives killed in the strike. It reported the IDF’s account that the vehicle contained rifles, a handgun, magazines, IEDs, gas grenades, and tens of thousands of shekels. Hamas’s military wing confirmed the three deaths while providing its own account of their location and circumstances.[3]

Senior military officials described the Jenin operation as an effort to create “operational freedom” for subsequent activity against terrorist networks. In their view, weakening those networks would make it easier to arrest wanted Palestinians and prevent attacks with fewer forces and less resistance.[7][2] The military anticipated further arrest raids and larger operations when needed, rather than an extended Israeli presence in Jenin.[7] Then-defense minister Yoav Gallant said airstrikes would be used “wherever necessary” to avoid endangering soldiers; he described the approach as “mowing the lawn” and added that “the moment will also come when we will pull out the roots.”[14]

Reporting on the end of the initial Jenin phase differed in scope. On September 6, Palestinian media reported that Israeli troops had withdrawn from Jenin after ten days of fighting. The IDF was reported as saying that operations had killed more than 30 gunmen across the campaign, while the Palestinian Authority health ministry reported 21 Palestinians killed during the Jenin operation.[15] A separate report said the military’s withdrawal from Jenin city did not mean the wider campaign had ended, and that forces might return to the refugee camp and eastern neighborhoods.[1]

After a lull of several days, the IDF resumed a major operation in the northern West Bank. A September 13 report identified the campaign as Summer Camps, dated its start to August 28, and relayed the IDF’s claim that ten gunmen had been killed in clashes and drone strikes since renewed activity began.[16] By October 1, reporting described the operation as still underway, with activity focused on camps in Jenin, Tulkarm, and Nur Shams and villages in the northern Jordan Valley.[4]

The later account described efforts to disrupt the explosives supply network as well as direct raids. Israeli forces reportedly confiscated dual-use materials, including fertilizer, destroyed explosives laboratories, and arrested individuals connected to the supply chain. The same report said Israeli forces had killed more than 100 terrorists in encounters and airstrikes and arrested many others; these totals were reported claims, not independently reconciled figures.[4]

The military’s reported figures changed as the campaign proceeded and depended on the location and time period covered. On August 28, reporting relayed the IDF’s account that five armed men had been killed in the Jenin and Tulkarm areas, suspects had been apprehended, and weapons and ammunition—including M-16 rifles—had been confiscated. The same report described four more armed men killed in an air operation near Far’a and the dismantling of explosives planted under roads.[6]

A report on the first 24 hours attributed to the IDF a total of 12 terrorists killed and more than ten people detained.[10] By September 2, the IDF was reported as saying that more than 30 gunmen had been killed across the campaign, including the heads of Hamas in Jenin and Islamic Jihad in the Tulkarm area. The same reporting said one Israeli soldier had been killed in Jenin and several other troops wounded. These were figures attributed to the military at that stage, not final counts.[7]

For Jenin, military figures relayed in reporting included 14 operatives killed in clashes and four drone strikes, 25 wanted Palestinians detained, about 20 weapons seized, and more than 30 explosive devices neutralized.[7] Another September 6 account said the IDF’s final reported tally for the Jenin operation was 14 operatives killed and more than 30 arrests. It described around 30 road-placed explosive devices dismantled, an explosives laboratory and weapons depot beneath a mosque destroyed, and weapons seized. FDD identified Wissam Hazem, described as a local Hamas leader, among those killed.[11]

Other accounts gave higher or broader figures. The Meir Amit center reported at least 18 operatives killed in the Jenin-area operation.[3] A September 6 Maariv report attributed to the IDF a northern Samaria tally of 36 terrorists killed and 46 arrested, alongside the discovery and confiscation of 24 weapons, three explosives laboratories, and many neutralized explosive devices. The reported figures have different geographic scopes and dates, and the sources do not reconcile them.[1]

The Meir Amit center’s account of the three operations reported more than 25 operatives killed in airstrikes and exchanges of fire, as well as wanted persons detained, weapons seized, explosives laboratories located, and IEDs destroyed on traffic routes.[3] A later Ynet report said the campaign had killed more than 100 terrorists by early October. These claims represent different reporting periods and definitions; they should not be treated as a single cumulative count without further evidence.[4]

Reporting also described Israeli security-force casualties. The Meir Amit center said an Israeli soldier was killed and another wounded in a Jenin exchange of fire on August 31, and reported at least ten Israeli security-force members wounded across operations in Jenin and Tulkarm.[3] Other accounts reported one soldier killed and several troops wounded by September 2. The exact totals and timeframes vary across the reports.[7]

The operation involved road closures and damage in areas where Israeli forces were searching for explosives. The IDF said it allowed civilians who wished to leave combat zones to use routes secured by the military, but did not issue evacuation orders. It estimated that about 85 percent of Jenin refugee camp’s population had moved out during the raid, mostly into Jenin city. The same reporting described damaged roads and municipal workers repairing infrastructure.[5]

In Nur Shams, the military said it accidentally damaged a water pipe while uncovering explosives beneath roads, adding that other water sources remained available. The Jerusalem Post reported that Foreign Minister Israel Katz had called for temporary evacuation of Palestinian residents, but the military was not following his recommendation to forcibly evacuate towns. These accounts describe the military’s position and do not establish how all residents experienced the operation.[6]

Palestinian accounts relayed in Ynet reporting said families had been forced to leave homes in Jenin refugee camp, with many residents moving out, especially from eastern Jenin. Those accounts also said the Jenin hospital was surrounded, damage to a main water line caused a shortage, and the army prevented water from being brought in. These claims differ from the military’s description of civilian movement, hospital access, and available water, and remain attributed to the reporting in which they appeared.[17]

The Meir Amit center attributed to Jenin mayor Nidal Obeidi an estimate that damage after four days of activity amounted to NIS 50 million. It also reported the municipality’s claim that more than 70 percent of the city’s streets had been destroyed and water service cut to 80 percent of the city and refugee camp. The figures are local-authority claims as reported by the center, rather than independently verified measurements in the supplied sources.[3]

Hospital access was another point of disagreement. The military said forces surrounded hospitals in areas of activity to prevent wanted persons from fleeing; Britannica described Israeli forces as controlling access to hospitals where the military said terrorists might hide. Palestinian reporting, by contrast, included claims that a hospital was surrounded and that residents faced restrictions on bringing in water. The sources present different accounts of the circumstances and purpose of these measures.[3][12]

Reported Palestinian deaths varied by source, date, and area covered. In accounts of the opening phase, the Red Crescent spokesman cited by the Jerusalem Post confirmed ten Palestinians killed and 15 wounded.[6] The IDF said it had killed nine Palestinians on the first day, with the report separately listing military claims of two killed in Jenin clashes, three in a drone strike near Jenin, and four in Far’a.[6] Another report covering the first 24 hours attributed 12 terrorists killed to the IDF,[10] while Palestinian media cited in a separate report put the death toll at 17.[5]

By September 1, the Meir Amit center reported Palestinian media figures of at least 17 Palestinians killed in the Jenin area.[3] A September 6 report relayed the Palestinian Authority health ministry’s figure of 21 Palestinians killed during the ten-day Jenin operation.[15] A Ynet report dated August 31 gave a Palestinian-reported figure of 23 killed across the operation at that point, while also reporting the IDF’s figure of 14 killed in Jenin alone and an Israeli estimate of about 30 terrorists killed overall.[17]

The figures are not directly comparable: some concern the opening day, others the first 24 hours or a longer period; some cover Jenin alone, while others refer to a wider area. They also use different categories, including Palestinians killed, armed men, terrorists, and operatives. The source material does not provide a unified, independently verified casualty count, so the claims are presented with their respective attributions and timeframes rather than combined.[6][5]

Reporting about Ayşenur Eygi, a Turkish-American activist, brought further international attention to Israeli military conduct during the campaign. Britannica reported that she was killed on September 6 while protesting settler violence near Nablus.[12] The U.S. State Department’s human-rights report, republished by the Jewish Virtual Library, said media reported that she was shot in the head and killed by an Israeli sniper while observing a demonstration in Beita. It also recorded the IDF’s September 10 statement that it was “highly likely” she had been hit indirectly and unintentionally by IDF fire not aimed at her; the investigation was still continuing at the end of 2024.[18]

The United Nations secretary-general called on Israel to cease its West Bank military operations. His spokesman said Antonio Guterres was “deeply concerned” and “strongly condemns the loss of lives, including of children,” and urged Israel to protect civilians, comply with international humanitarian law, and use lethal force only when strictly unavoidable to protect life. Israeli UN Ambassador Danny Danon rejected the criticism, saying the operation aimed to prevent Iranian-backed attacks. These statements expressed sharply different assessments of the campaign and its context.[5]

Britannica described the campaign as a large-scale offensive involving airstrikes in the northern West Bank and raids across the territory.[12] It noted that Eygi’s death drew international attention to concerns about Israeli military conduct during the offensive. The available accounts thus include both Israel’s counterterrorism rationale and external criticism focused on casualties, civilian protection, and the conduct of military operations.[12][18]

The CRS account situated the campaign within wider Israeli concerns about attacks originating in the West Bank, but did not supply detailed operation-specific analysis or outcomes.[8] The State Department’s terrorism report likewise discussed routine Israeli counterterrorism entries and resulting clashes without identifying this operation specifically. These broader reports provide context but do not resolve disagreements about the campaign’s conduct or effects.[9]

The withdrawal of Israeli troops from Jenin city after roughly ten days did not mark a definitive end to all activity associated with the campaign.[1] Reports described a pause followed by resumed operations in the northern West Bank.[16] The IDF was reported as retaining the option of returning to Jenin if needed; the military had not set an end date, and the stated approach anticipated further arrest raids and larger operations when considered necessary.[1]

By October 1, Israeli reporting described the campaign as continuing in refugee camps and villages across northern Samaria, including areas in the northern Jordan Valley. The later report’s claims of more than 100 terrorists killed and many arrested, together with efforts to confiscate materials and disrupt explosives supply chains, indicate that the campaign’s reported scope extended beyond the first ten-day phase in Jenin. These later figures remain attributed to the reporting and are not independently reconciled in the available sources.[4]

Britannica reported that four refugee camps in the affected areas, including the Tulkarm camp and Nur Shams near Tulkarm, remained areas of heavy fighting until January 2025. That account concerns the longer course of fighting in those places; it does not establish that the August 2024 campaign continued unchanged until January.[19]

Accounts of the campaign differ in how they define its name and geographical scope. The Meir Amit center separates the activity into “Summer Camps” in Jenin, “Ir Shemesh” in Nur Shams, and “Olim Kita” in Far’a.[3] FDD’s September 6 report uses “Operation Summer Camps” for a ten-day sweep encompassing all three locations,[11] while other reporting says the IDF used “Summer Camps” for the broader campaign.[2] The CRS describes a major operation in the northern West Bank without naming it.[8] These differences should be retained rather than collapsed into one supposedly uncontested label.

The same caution applies to results. Military-reported totals for those killed, detained, and weapons or explosives seized vary by date, location, and source.[3][1] Palestinian media and health authorities reported different casualty figures,[15] while accounts of displacement, damage, water access, and hospital restrictions also diverged.[5][17] The supplied sources do not resolve these differences into a single independently verified record.

In the Israeli military’s account, the campaign sought to weaken Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorist networks, destroy explosives infrastructure, and preserve freedom of action against future attacks.[2] International criticism, including the UN secretary-general’s call to cease operations and reporting on Eygi’s death, placed civilian protection and military conduct at the center of the public debate.[5][18] The campaign therefore remains described through competing operational rationales, casualty accounts, and assessments of its human impact.