2011 Southern Israel Cross-Border Attacks

Route 12 ran close to the Israel–Egypt boundary in the area attacked, leaving vehicles on the road exposed to gunmen operating along the border.[2] The attacks occurred north of Eilat around the Netafim area.[5][6] Buses, private vehicles and Israeli patrols used the corridor that became the focus of the coordinated assault.[2]

Israeli authorities had received a general warning several days earlier that an attack might be launched from Sinai, but the intelligence did not specify its time or precise location.[2] A later military inquiry explained that the available warning lacked a clear location and that Route 12 had been opened on the morning of August 18 as part of an effort to maintain normal civilian activity.[7] The border fence and other protective measures were not yet complete.[7]

A separate warning from Jordan reached Israel shortly before the attacks, indicating that a cell was preparing an operation.[5] A contemporaneous account placed the arrival of that warning only minutes before the shooting began.[8] The combination of a broader advance warning and a last-minute alert subsequently became relevant to the examination of the army’s preparations and its decision to permit traffic on the road.[5][7]

Relations between Israel and Egypt were already strained amid Egypt’s revolution and public resentment toward Israel.[3] The deaths of Egyptian security personnel during the ensuing fighting therefore occurred against an already difficult political backdrop, rather than beginning a diplomatic dispute in otherwise untroubled circumstances.[3] The restrictions on Egyptian military deployments in Sinai under the peace accord also became relevant to subsequent discussions about strengthening border security.[9]

The attacks began around noon on August 18 and involved several coordinated groups operating along Route 12.[10][2] Early Israeli security estimates placed the attacking force at between 10 and 20 people, while another contemporary assessment described as many as 20 participants.[5][2] Their weapons included automatic rifles, rocket-propelled grenades, improvised explosive devices, explosive vests and a mortar.[2][11] Civilian vehicles were attacked directly, and explosive devices were used against Israeli forces arriving to assist the victims.[2]

One account placed the initial shooting around noon, when gunmen opened fire on Egged bus 392 as it traveled toward Eilat.[5] Witnesses described attackers wearing army uniforms; soldiers aboard the bus returned fire and helped treat the wounded.[5] The bus continued to the checkpoint at the Netafim junction rather than remaining at the ambush site.[5] Its driver, Gil Toshiya, continued driving under fire, an action credited in contemporaneous reporting with probably preventing additional casualties.[6]

Another contemporary timeline placed an opening attack at approximately 12:20 p.m., describing an attacker firing at an empty bus and detonating an explosive belt while another fired an RPG.[12] An early military account described three attackers spreading across an approximately 300-meter area and firing first at a bus, then at a car and another bus.[13] These descriptions capture the closely spaced assaults on different vehicles rather than a single attack confined to one target.[5][13]

At approximately 12:30 p.m., explosive devices were detonated against an Israeli force responding to the first scene.[5] Around 12:40 p.m., a mortar shell exploded near a vehicle without causing injuries.[5] At approximately 1:30 p.m., gunmen fired at another bus and a private vehicle; an anti-tank missile aimed at the bus struck the car and killed its occupants.[5] A separate account described an RPG attack on a car about 10 miles north of the principal ambush position.[14]

The assault extended beyond the initial shootings at passing vehicles.[2][14] An explosive device was detonated against a responding military vehicle, while gunmen used an ambush position extending for roughly 300 yards along the road.[14] Two civilian buses and several cars were among the targets, and the use of explosives against arriving troops made the rescue and pursuit operation itself a further target.[2] Medical teams had difficulty reaching wounded people because exchanges of fire were continuing.[6]

Special forces from the Golani Infantry Brigade and a police counterterrorism unit responded to the attacks.[2] Ground forces and aircraft took part in a major manhunt, while Eilat police activated emergency arrangements.[5] Some Israeli troops briefly crossed into Sinai while engaging the attackers.[2] Contemporary reporting put the number of attackers killed at seven; a separate account described at least seven killed in the fighting.[5][14]

The initial attacks were followed by further shooting later in the day.[13] Police counterterrorism officer Pascal Avrahami was killed while Israeli forces searched for attackers who might still be in the area.[13] His death brought the confirmed Israeli toll that evening to eight: six civilians, one Golani soldier and one police counterterrorism officer.[13] The later engagement explains why reports issued earlier in the day carried a lower death toll than the evening account.[13][15]

The eight Israeli victims were Flora Gaz and her sister Shula Karlinsky; their husbands, Moshe Gaz and Dov Karlinsky; private-car driver Yosef Levy; bus driver Yitzhak Sela; Golani reconnaissance soldier Moshe Naftali; and police officer Pascal Avrahami.[16] The attack thus killed both civilians traveling through the area and security personnel engaged in the response.[13][16] Injury reports placed the number of wounded in the dozens, with a U.S. official account giving approximately 40.[1]

The emergency response extended to hospitals and transportation routes around Eilat.[5] Yoseftal Hospital activated a mass-casualty response, roads leading to Eilat were closed, and Ovda Airfield was shut.[5] One contemporaneous account reported that 29 injured people were evacuated to Yoseftal and seven were transferred to Soroka Hospital.[8] The Counter-Terrorism Bureau warned Israelis against traveling to Sinai and urged those already there to leave.[5]

Israeli security officials assessed that the attackers had intended a larger operation, possibly including the abduction of a soldier, and credited the rapid military and special-forces response with preventing further casualties.[5] A later account by a deputy brigade commander described coordinated subgroups carrying explosives and equipment including zip ties, which he interpreted as evidence of plans for both mass killing and an abduction.[5] The assessment concerned the attackers’ apparent intended objectives, beyond the shootings and bombings they actually carried out.[5]

On the evening of August 18, Israel struck Popular Resistance Committees leaders in Rafah after identifying the organization as responsible for the attack.[2] The Washington Institute reported that the strike killed PRC leader Kamal Nairab and four lieutenants, including military commander Imad Hamad.[2] A contemporaneous Ynetnews report gave a total of six people killed at the building, including two identified PRC leaders.[13]

The Israeli response continued with strikes against targets in Gaza as armed groups launched rockets and mortars toward Israeli communities.[1][2] The U.S. State Department recorded approximately 400 rockets and mortars fired from August 18 through August 25, killing one person and injuring 27.[1]

A separate chronology recorded more than 150 rockets and 45 mortars fired into Israel during August as a whole.[17] For August 20–25, it listed 106 rocket hits and 40 mortar hits, including attacks affecting Beersheba, Ashkelon and Ashdod; one Israeli civilian was killed and at least 13 civilians were injured during that period.[17] It also reported that fire continued despite a ceasefire reached between Israel and Hamas on August 22.[17] The State Department and chronology used different measures and reporting periods, with the former describing projectiles fired and the latter listing identified hits.[1][17]

For August 17–19, a period beginning before the cross-border assault, the rocket chronology recorded 27 rocket hits, two mortar hits and at least seven people injured.[17] A rocket struck a yeshiva, while another landed on a synagogue without exploding.[17] The Abdullah Azzam Brigades claimed responsibility for firing at least two rockets on August 19.[17] These attacks on Israeli communities continued alongside the military exchanges following the Route 12 assault.[1][17]

On August 23, an Israeli airstrike killed Ismail Asmar, an Islamic Jihad commander from Rafah.[18] An Israeli defense establishment source identified him as having financed the southern Israel attack; the military statement associated him with weapons smuggling and support for terrorist activity in Sinai.[18] A second person in the vehicle targeted by the strike was wounded.[18]

The border fighting also killed Egyptian security personnel and triggered a major diplomatic confrontation.[3][19] Egyptian authorities demanded an apology and compensation, while thousands demonstrated outside the Israeli Embassy in Cairo.[3] Protesters burned an Israeli flag and called for the ambassador’s expulsion and the embassy’s closure.[3] Demonstrations also included calls to alter or abolish the peace treaty, and Egypt’s cabinet considered Israel’s initial expression of regret insufficient.[20]

Several days after the attack, an Israeli military delegation traveled to Egypt for talks.[3] Israel issued two public statements of regret over the deaths of Egyptian soldiers or police, while U.S. officials held discussions with both countries to reduce tensions.[3] The Institute for National Security Studies reported that Egypt’s government initially adopted a forceful public position before rapidly softening it; a declaration that Egypt would recall its ambassador was removed, and officials subsequently said that a recall had never been considered.[19]

The crisis intensified on the night of September 9–10, when protests over the August deaths escalated outside the Israeli Embassy in Cairo.[21] Demonstrators breached the outer wall and entered embassy offices, trapping six Israeli guards inside.[21] Egyptian commandos rescued the guards early on September 10 and escorted them to the airport; the Israeli ambassador and other embassy staff had already left Egypt.[21] Israeli diplomats returned to work ten days later, with additional Egyptian police and soldiers deployed around the building.[21]

A joint Israeli–Egyptian inquiry followed an agreement between Defense Minister Ehud Barak and Field Marshal Mohamed Hussein Tantawi, head of Egypt’s Supreme Council of the Armed Forces.[22] The inquiry examined the border events and lessons for preventing future attacks and improving security, but its contents remained classified.[22] Following its findings, Barak decided to apologize to Egypt for the deaths of five Egyptian border policemen from Israeli fire.[22] The apology followed the earlier expressions of regret and the bilateral military discussions.[3][22]

Proposals to strengthen security in Sinai raised questions about the military deployment provisions of the peace accord.[9] A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs commentary reported that Barak said Israel would agree to Egypt stationing thousands of additional soldiers there.[9] The commentary also reported that Knesset Speaker Reuven Rivlin asked the Knesset’s legal adviser to examine whether parliamentary approval was needed for a deployment change, because the accord limited the numbers and types of Egyptian forces permitted in Sinai.[9]

The scale of Israel’s response in Gaza also attracted analysis.[23] A Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs commentary argued that Israel struck PRC leaders without undertaking a major Gaza operation partly because of Egypt’s fragile post-Mubarak political situation.[23] Its author suggested that a larger operation could have strengthened demands in Egypt to cancel the peace treaty.[23] This was an interpretation of Israeli restraint, rather than a published account of an official decision-making process.[23]

A later Israeli military inquiry acknowledged that opening Route 12 on the morning of the attacks had been a mistake.[7] It nevertheless explained that the intelligence had not identified a precise time or clear location and that the decision formed part of a wider effort to permit normal civilian activity.[7] The inquiry placed the road-opening decision alongside the incomplete border fence and other security measures when examining the conditions in which the attack occurred.[7]

Route 12 remained closed after the attacks and reopened in February 2012.[24] By its reopening, the route had observation posts, a heavy security fence and increased patrols.[24] Israeli–Egyptian security cooperation had also reportedly increased.[24] These changes formed the most direct physical and operational legacy along the corridor where civilian traffic and responding forces had been attacked.[24]

Moshe Naftali’s role received subsequent formal recognition.[16] A 2012 account reported that he had been killed by friendly fire while responding to the assault and that Chief of Staff Benny Gantz approved a commendation for his courage and determination to press the fight.[16] The army credited the rapid arrival and actions of his force with helping stop the attackers’ plan.[16] The later account therefore added both a finding about the circumstances of his death and recognition of his conduct during the response.[16]

The attacks were described in a U.S. official terrorism assessment as the most significant acts of terrorism in Israel since 2008.[1] Their consequences included the immediate loss of Israeli civilian and security-force lives, a further round of rocket attacks and Israeli strikes, a prolonged road closure, and a diplomatic confrontation that reached the Israeli Embassy in Cairo.[1][21] The reopening of the road under heavier protection and the joint inquiry with Egypt reflected the subsequent emphasis on preventing another cross-border assault.[22][24]

Contemporary accounts attributed the attacks to the Popular Resistance Committees. The Washington Institute described the assault as having been conducted by PRC elements, while a Congressional Research Service report described the attackers as a Gazan PRC cell that crossed Sinai.[2][21] The PRC denied involvement, and the Meir Amit Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center reported that no organization publicly claimed responsibility immediately afterward.[10] An Israeli inquiry found that at least three attackers were Egyptian citizens who had joined Palestinian PRC operatives; an Egyptian official had initially denied Egyptian involvement.[25] The Institute for National Security Studies likewise said Egyptian citizens linked to Sinai jihadist groups may have participated.[19] A contemporary Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs commentary went further, portraying the PRC as a Hamas “terrorist arm,” an interpretation rather than an independently established operational finding.[26]

Subsequent claims introduced additional attributions.[4][1] Ansar Jerusalem, also called Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis, issued a responsibility statement on September 7, 2011, while a U.S. official account named a group calling itself Ansar al-Jihad as having claimed the attack.[4][1] Congressional testimony later referred to the Ansar Jerusalem statement as claiming the “two Eilat operations” and quoted Ayman al-Zawahiri praising the attackers.[27] A later video associated with Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis presented an account of planning and execution, including border surveillance and division into three cells; its operational narrative remained the organization’s retrospective claim.[28][29]

The Egyptian deaths also produced differing accounts.[1][25] An early Israeli inquiry said responsibility for the fatal shots remained unclear and reported that Israeli aircraft had diverted fire away from Egyptian troops and vehicles; the later joint inquiry was followed by Israel’s apology for deaths from Israeli fire.[25][22] Reported Egyptian death tolls varied, including five in the account of the apology and six in the U.S. terrorism report.[22][1] Israeli injury totals likewise ranged from 30 to approximately 40.[6][1] The rise from seven to eight reported Israeli fatalities reflected confirmation of Avrahami’s death later on August 18.[15][13]