162nd Division (Israel)

The 162nd Division has combined armored and infantry formations with artillery and engineering capabilities. A 2018 exercise involved Givati, Nahal, the 401st Armored Brigade, the 215th Artillery Regiment, the 179th Reserve Armored Brigade, and elements of Kfir.[8] Its 2016 transfer to Southern Command formed part of the Gideon multi-year plan and emphasized flexible defensive and offensive operations on multiple fronts.[7]

The division’s operational record spans canal-crossing warfare in Egypt and armored and infantry operations in Lebanon.[9][4] It later conducted prolonged urban and underground operations in Gaza.[6][10] In the Yom Kippur War it fought under Avraham “Bren” Adan and participated in crossing the Suez Canal and encircling Egypt’s Third Army.[9] In Gaza, it began ground operations on October 27, 2023, and continued operating for 15 months before handing responsibility for the northern security zone to the 252nd Division in February 2025.[11]

Its subordinate and attached forces have varied over time and between operations.[12][8] The 401st Armored Brigade appears in accounts of the division’s organization and combat in both Lebanon and Gaza, while infantry, reserve, engineering, and naval commando units have operated with the division in particular campaigns.[4][13] Historical organizational lists therefore describe the formation at particular dates, rather than a single unchanging order of battle.[12][8]

At the opening of the Yom Kippur War in October 1973, the 162nd Division was based on the Armored Corps headquarters and commanded by Maj. Gen. Avraham Adan.[14] After the regular 7th and 460th brigades had been removed from its composition before the war, it received the reserve 217th and 500th armored brigades and the 204th Mechanized Brigade when mobilization began on October 6.[14] Its initial assignment was to move toward the Baluzah–Qantara area in northern Sinai and prepare to participate in a counterattack.[14]

The movement into Sinai was hampered by congestion, vehicle problems, and the difficulty of transporting tanks along a narrow route.[14] The 217th Brigade commander was instructed to prepare 75 tanks for transport toward Romani, and Adan departed with the first tanks.[14] On October 7, an Egyptian commando ambush between Romani and Baluzah disrupted the movement and diverted attention from the division’s principal mission.[14] The fighting damaged Israeli armored vehicles and a fuel truck and involved dispersed small groups rather than a coordinated divisional assault; initiative by junior commanders, including Shaked reconnaissance soldiers, helped eliminate the ambush and reopen the route.[14]

The division suffered severe losses between October 6 and 8 while attempting to stop the Egyptian attack and push Egyptian forces back across the canal, and it participated in the October 8 counterattack attempt.[9][15] Beginning October 15, forces from the 143rd and 162nd divisions fought to widen the corridor leading to the Suez Canal crossing.[3] The fighting around the Chinese Farm was particularly costly: more than 150 Israeli soldiers were killed there during the nights of October 15 and 16, a figure encompassing the fighting in that area rather than the 162nd Division alone.[3]

Adan’s division had initially been assigned to follow the canal crossing, but first had to clear Egyptian units from the approach corridor and widen the routes to the bridges.[16] Heavy fighting continued through October 16 and into midday October 17; Adan’s forces crossed during the night of October 17–18.[16] Their first tasks west of the canal were to destroy antiaircraft missile sites and advance toward the Geneifa Hills.[16] They subsequently moved toward Geneifa and Suez, clearing the western shores of the Bitter Lake and canal and reaching the outskirts of Suez.[16] The advance, conducted during Operation Stouthearted Men, contributed to the encirclement of Egypt’s Third Army.[9] A retrospective account recorded 550 division soldiers killed and approximately 1,200 wounded during the war.[15]

During Operation Peace for Galilee in 1982, the division was assigned to advance rapidly through Lebanon toward the Beirut–Damascus road and the Dahr al-Baydar mountain pass.[5] The intended maneuver would threaten Syrian forces from the flank and rear and potentially sever the main road linking Beirut and Damascus.[5] The division began moving from the Giv’at Ha’em area on June 6, but route changes, traffic, fuel and logistical difficulties, and decisions about the permissible extent of its advance delayed progress.[5]

The division reached Ein Zhalta late on June 8 and encountered Syrian blocking forces.[5] Fighting on June 9 did not restore the advance, while infantry and armored operations on June 10 secured the Safa River crossing and bridge.[5] The IDF history concludes that the division did not reach the Beirut–Damascus road during the first week and says that changes in higher-level operational priorities reduced the importance assigned to the original mission after the fighting at Ein Zhalta.[5] Danny Yatom later commanded the Steel Formation in 1985–1986, having previously served in the Armored Corps and as a deputy battalion commander on the southern front during the Yom Kippur War.[17]

In the 2006 Lebanon War, the 162nd was one of four Israeli divisions committed to the fighting.[4] It took responsibility for the eastern sector of southern Lebanon from the 91st Division on July 21, and its two-brigade attack on al-Khiam ended on July 25.[4] RAND assesses that the divisions primarily conducted battalion- and brigade-sized raids against Hezbollah positions and rocket-launching locations, rather than participating in a coordinated Northern Command campaign directed toward a collective strategic end state.[4]

For Operation Changing Direction 11, the 162nd Division constituted Northern Command’s main effort.[4] Its mission was to take positions throughout the western sector of southern Lebanon, crossing the Saluki River from the east and advancing north to link with the 98th Division along the Litani River.[4] It began attempts to breach Wadi Saluki on August 9 but halted when the operation was delayed; border-clearing missions followed on August 11.[4]

The 401st Armored Brigade attempted the crossing on August 12, but its 9th Battalion did not open the route, and 12 Israeli soldiers were killed and 44 wounded.[4] RAND describes poor coordination with the 931st Nahal Battalion, inadequate tank training, and denied requests for artillery and air support.[4] A renewed attempt on August 13 achieved a crossing by 0300, but Northern Command halted the offensive; RAND concludes that the division did not accomplish its assigned mission.[4]

A 2011 organizational snapshot placed the division under Central Command and listed the 401st Brigade, its tank battalions and reconnaissance company, attached Engineering Battalion 601, reserve forces, Nahal, and Kfir.[12] Kfir had been officially formed in February 2005 from the Nachshon, Shimshon, Duchifat, Netzach Yehuda, Lavi, and Haruv battalions; its organizational listing also included Sayeret Oketz and Sayeret LOTAR.[18] The 401st Brigade had originated in 1968 to control the Suez Canal line, suffered heavy losses there during the Yom Kippur War, and fought with the southern force in the First Lebanon War, including a battalion at Sultan Yaakov.[19] Its Magach tanks were replaced with Merkava-4 tanks in 2004–2005.[19]

In January 2016, the Steel Formation formally moved from Central Command to Southern Command, and Givati was placed under it.[7] The division had been based in Central Command for nearly 40 years, having left Southern Command after the peace treaty with Egypt.[20] It ceased commanding the Jordan Valley Territorial Brigade, which remained in Central Command.[20] The transfer emphasized preparation for defensive and offensive battles, deep maneuver, and firepower employment in complex terrain on different fronts.[7]

A large 2018 Gaza-scenario exercise involved Givati, Nahal, the 401st Armored Brigade, the 215th Artillery Regiment, the 179th Reserve Armored Brigade, and elements of Kfir.[8] Planned before a contemporaneous escalation, it practiced a deterioration along the Gaza border.[8] This was a command-post exercise rather than a full field deployment: officers from company commander upward participated without their troops, who remained on regular assignments.[8]

Under division commander Brig. Gen. Oded Basyuk, the exercise tested the divisional headquarters and faster coordination between battalion-level target identification and air strikes.[8] The division also adopted a Gaza-specific approach called “Steel Foundations” (אדני פלדה), intended to defeat Hamas tactical formations through intelligence from multiple sources while addressing tunnels, drones, and other threats.[8] In the 2020 General Staff exercise, it practiced varied scenarios and complex conditions as a multi-arena division.[21]

Brig. Gen. Itzik Cohen commanded the division at the start of the 2023 Gaza ground campaign.[6] On October 7, he had commanded a sector near the Gaza border, helped restore control of military outposts, and led the operation to retake the Sderot police station.[6] The division was the first to enter Gaza in the ground campaign, beginning its operations on October 27.[11][6] Its 401st Brigade advanced along the coast and linked with Israeli forces entering Gaza port.[22] A later analysis identified it alongside the 36th, 252nd, and 99th divisions among the formations deployed in the northern Gaza ground invasion.[23]

By November, Cohen announced that the division had reached the approaches to Gaza City.[24] Givati suffered 13 deaths in two incidents: 11 Tzabar Battalion soldiers were killed when an antitank missile struck a Namer vehicle, and two reconnaissance soldiers were killed in an RPG attack on a building.[24] The 401st and Givati led the maneuver into al-Shati camp, Nahal captured a main outpost, and the Commando Brigade also operated in the camp.[25] The IDF said its forces encountered resistance in booby-trapped homes and subsequently cleared tunnels and weapons caches.[25]

IDF figures reported during the November campaign credited the division with destroying more than 160 tunnel shafts, striking approximately 2,800 Hamas sites, and killing around 1,000 terrorists and senior commanders.[26] Cohen estimated that rocket fire from northern Gaza toward Israel had fallen by approximately 80 percent.[26] The IDF also said its forces secured Hamas facilities including the Force 17 outpost and the security quarter.[26] A December account described operational control of Shati being achieved within four days, troops reaching a house associated with Yahya Sinwar and an underground area beneath it, intelligence collection at al-Rantisi Hospital, and special operations recovering the remains of five soldiers and hostages.[27]

In February 2024, the IDF reported that the division operated in the al-Shati area with the 401st, Nahal, and 5th brigades and special forces.[28] The IDF said the operation included a crossing of Gaza City in less than two hours and the establishment of operational control within several hours.[28] Over approximately two weeks, forces collected intelligence, seized weapons, cleared infrastructure, and destroyed a tunnel route containing what the IDF described as a Hamas intelligence asset beneath UNRWA headquarters.[28] Artillery, air, and naval support accompanied the operation, during which the IDF said approximately 150 combat and artillery targets were struck.[28]

After three months in the central Gaza corridor area, the division prepared to leave with Nahal in April 2024.[2] Nahal’s combat team had conducted five brigade-level operations in Shati, Zeitoun, al-Shifa, Nuseirat, and the central corridor, and worked with Yahalom and other engineers to locate and destroy more than 20 kilometers of underground routes.[2] The reserve 2nd Carmeli Infantry Brigade and 679th Yiftah Armored Brigade replaced it in the corridor.[10] By this stage, the 162nd and 98th divisions had served longer in Gaza than other divisions.[22]

The division began leading the Rafah campaign on the evening of May 6, 2024, after six months of fighting in northern Gaza.[29] Its initial objective was to take the Philadelphi Corridor along the Egyptian border and then advance into Rafah.[29] Forces operating with it included Givati, Nahal, the 401st Armored Brigade, the 12th “Negev” Reserve Infantry Brigade, Yahalom combat engineers, and Shayetet 13 naval commandos.[13]

On May 29, the IDF said the operation had established operational control over the Philadelphi Corridor, where approximately 20 tunnels had been located for investigation and neutralization.[30] The IDF also said the 401st Brigade operated in and destroyed a 1.5-kilometer underground route in eastern Rafah, whose entrance lay approximately 100 meters from the Rafah crossing.[30] By June 17, forces were operating neighborhood by neighborhood in Shabura and Tel al-Sultan.[29] Control of the corridor, extending from the sea to the Israel–Gaza–Egypt border, was intended to cut off future smuggling to Hamas.[31]

In September, the campaign’s announced results included the dismantling of Hamas’s Rafah Brigade and destruction of approximately 13 kilometers, or eight miles, of underground routes.[13] Cohen declared that the brigade’s four battalions had been destroyed and that the division had completed operational control of the urban area.[13] Earlier assessments distinguished the brigade’s inability to function as a fighting unit from the continued presence of individual terrorists.[31]

According to military figures, the tunnel-clearing effort located approximately 200 underground spaces near the Philadelphi Corridor, including nine tunnels crossing the Egyptian border; another campaign summary recorded the destruction of 80 percent of the tunnels discovered near and beneath the corridor.[32][13] Division figures published in September recorded 2,308 Hamas terrorists killed, including 800 in Tel al-Sultan, alongside 34 division soldiers killed and 739 wounded; approximately 500 of the wounded subsequently returned to combat.[32] A separate IDF announcement placed the opposing losses at more than 2,000 Hamas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad terrorists.[33]

On October 4, 2024, the division received orders to leave Rafah for northern Gaza and began attacking Jabalia within 48 hours.[34] The 401st advanced from Zikim and encircled southern Jabalia, while the 460th Brigade advanced from the Black Arrow memorial area and Nizmit Hill.[34] The maneuver cut northern Gaza off from Gaza City; Givati subsequently replaced the 460th, and by November the division was operating with brigade combat teams from the 401st, Givati, and Kfir.[34] Raids near Jabalia included weapons seizures and the discovery and destruction of tunnel shafts.[35]

Col. Ahsan Daksa, commander of the 401st Brigade, was killed in combat in northern Gaza on October 20, aged 41.[36] A November account of the Jabalia operation recorded approximately 1,000 terrorists killed and 700 surrendering, including dozens identified as participants in the October 7 attack.[37] More than 50,000 civilians had left the area, while troops neutralized 200 booby-trapped buildings and dozens of tank mines.[37]

By December, Givati and the 401st had established a barrier on a southern route between Jabalia and Gaza City.[38] Engineering Battalion 601, Nahal’s Battalion 50, elements of the 401st, and Givati’s Tzabar Battalion advanced from the north.[38] Estimates published at that stage placed Hamas losses at approximately 1,500 terrorists killed and 2,000 surrendering, with several hundred remaining in central Jabalia.[38]

Following withdrawal from the Netzarim Corridor, the division was deployed in the northern Gaza buffer zone in February 2025, with responsibility for protecting perimeter communities from Zikim to Beeri.[39] The Gaza Division held the southern buffer zone and Philadelphi Corridor.[39] On February 17, the 162nd transferred northern security-zone responsibility to the 252nd Division after 15 months of continuous operations.[11] Its campaign losses stood at 265 soldiers and commanders, and it was assigned to prepare for future missions according to operational needs and political decisions.[11]

Brig. Gen. Sagiv Dahan assumed command on April 6, 2025, replacing Cohen, who was due to become head of the Operations Directorate and receive promotion to major general.[1] At the ceremony, Cohen acknowledged the military’s failure on October 7 while discussing the division’s subsequent response.[1] In September 2025, the 162nd joined the 98th and 36th divisions in expanding the ground offensive into Gaza City during Gideon’s Chariots II.[40]

On March 26, 2026, the division began targeted ground activities in southern Lebanon alongside the 91st and 36th divisions after preparations for the northern-front assignment following two years of combat in Gaza.[41] Its stated purpose was to strengthen the forward defensive posture and improve security for northern Israeli residents.[41] An April 3 update listed it alongside the 91st, 146th, and 36th divisions in a focused ground effort involving infrastructure clearance and attacks on opposing forces.[42]

A separate account of post-ceasefire operations in former Hezbollah strongholds described the division opening a shorter route enabling operations up to 14 kilometers inside Lebanon.[43] Combat teams from Nahal, the 401st, and the 215th were credited with killing 251 operatives, destroying 404 infrastructure sites, neutralizing 644 sites, and seizing more than 1,000 weapons in operations intended to prevent fire toward northern Israeli communities.[43] In October 2026, a further announcement identified the 162nd as the planned replacement for the 99th Division in northern Gaza after the latter’s four-month mission; this was an announced deployment rather than confirmation of arrival.[44]

The 162nd Division’s participation in the Suez Canal crossing and encirclement of the Egyptian Third Army connected it with major operations of the Yom Kippur War’s final stage.[9] Its later role as Northern Command’s main effort in Operation Changing Direction 11 likewise placed it at the center of a major planned maneuver in the 2006 Lebanon War.[4]

The 2016 transfer and subsequent training emphasized a formation capable of moving between theaters and combining infantry, armor, engineering, artillery, and air support in complex conditions.[7][8] Its Gaza operations applied those capabilities across coastal advances, urban combat, corridor control, and extensive underground clearance.[22][10] By September 2025, it had served across Gaza for most of the war and had accumulated extensive urban-fighting experience.[40]

That operational record also involved substantial personnel losses.[11] The 265 soldiers and commanders lost during its first 15 months in Gaza followed earlier heavy casualties in the Yom Kippur War and the costly Saluki crossing attempt in 2006.[11][4]

Seven World Central Kitchen workers were killed by Israeli fire in Gaza on April 1, 2024, in strikes on three aid vehicles.[45] The investigation released on April 5 found mistaken identification and decision-making errors, and concluded that the attack violated standard operating procedures.[45] The resulting command measures included formal reprimands for the 162nd Division commander and Southern Command commander.[45] A commentary account by the Jerusalem Center for Security and Foreign Affairs also describes a reprimand for the brigade commander and the dismissal of the brigade fire-support commander and chief of staff.[46]

Operational totals for terrorist casualties, tunnel destruction, surrendering combatants, and reductions in rocket fire derive largely from military announcements and commanders’ assessments, rather than independent verification.[26][32] Published Jabalia figures also represent different reporting dates and cumulative estimates.[37][38] The assessments of the division’s unsuccessful 1982 and 2006 missions rest respectively on an official military history and a single detailed analytical account.[5][4]